Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies, Masters and Seafarers

针对公司、船长和海员的全球防海盗指南

Contents 目录

Fundamentals 基本原则

The fundamental requirements of best practices to avoid attack by pirates and armed robbers are:

避免海盗和武装强盗袭击的最佳做法的基本要求是：

1. Conduct thorough, ship-specific pre-voyage threat and risk assessments to identify appropriate Ship Protection Measures (SPMs).

   进行全面的、针对特定船舶的航行前威胁和风险评估，以确定适当的船舶保护措施

2. Implement SPMs as identified in the pre-voyage risk assessment. Companies may always wish to consider new and innovative SPMs beyond the scope of this guidance and provide additional equipment or manpower as a means of further reducing risk. If attackers cannot board a ship they cannot hijack it.

   执行航行前风险评估中确定的船舶保护措施（SPMs）。公司可能总是希望考虑超出本指南范围的新的和创新的船舶保护措施，并提供更多的设备或人力作为进一步降低风险的手段。如果攻击者不能登上一艘船，他们就不能劫持它。

3. Ships should register in accordance with the requirements of any Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) they are transiting.

   船舶应按要求在任何他们将经过的自愿报告区（VRA）登记。

4. Ships are strongly encouraged to report daily when operating in in a VRA either by email or phone using the relevant Ship Position Reporting – Daily Position. Particularly vulnerable ships will be noted and monitored.

   强烈建议船舶在VRA营运时应每天通过电子邮件或电话使用船舶相关船舶位置报告（格式）来汇报船舶位置-每日位置。特别容易受到攻击的船只将被关注和监控。

   A proper, visible lookout is the most effective method of ship protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, allows defences to be deployed and, can serve as an effective deterrent to would-be attackers.

   合适的、可见范围内的了望是保护船舶最有效的方法。它有助于识别靠近的可疑目标或早期的攻击行为，允许船舶提前做好防御部署，"有防范"的信号可以作为对潜在攻击者的有效威慑。

如果袭击者无法登轮，他们就无法劫持船舶！

Aide Memoire 备忘录

DID BEING A VICTIM OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 避免成为海盗及武装抢劫的受害者	
Do Not Be ALONE 不要落单	• Report to the relevant reporting centre and Register Transit 向相关报告中心报告并登记过境情况 • Co-operate with military or other counter piracy services where such missions exist 与有此类任务的军队或其他反海盗服务机构合作 • It is recommended to keep AIS turned on 建议打开 AIS
Do Not Be DETECTED 不要被探测到	• Keep track of NAVWARNS and visit relevant websites for known pirate operating locations 跟踪航行警告并访问相关网站了解海盗活动范围 • Consider the appropriate level of lighting to be used in areas of risk 在高风险区域考虑使用适当的照明
Do Not Be SURPRISED 不要被吓着	• Increased Vigilance – lookouts, CCTV and Radar 提高警觉，通过瞭望、CCTV和雷达监控
Do Not Be VULNERABLE 不要成为攻击对象	• Use visible (deterrent) and physical (preventative) Ship Protection Measures 使用可见的（威慑）和物理（预防措施）船舶保护措施 • These could include: razor wire, use of water/ foam etc. 包括：防海盗钢丝网，高压水/泡沫等。 • Provide additional personal protection to bridge teams 驾驶台增加了望人员
Do Not Be BOARDED 不要让其登轮	• Increase to Maximum speed 加至最高速的 • Manoeuvre the ship without severely reducing speed. 在不明显减速的前提下机动转向
Do Not Be CONTROLLED 不要被控制	• Follow well practiced procedures and drills 遵循良好做法，加强演习 • Use of Citadels (Only with prior agreement Master/Company and fully prepared and drilled – noting a Naval/Military response is not guaranteed) 使用避难处(只有事先征得船长/公司同意,并经过充分准备和训练——不保证有任何海军/军队响应) • Deny use of tools, equipment and, access routes 拒绝使用工具，设备和进入通道

SECTON 1

Introduction 简介

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

海上的海盗及武装劫持

Piracy and armed robbery at sea is an organised and persistent criminal activity prevalent in many parts of the world. Attackers are often aggressive and subject their victims to violence and ill treatment. Ships have been hijacked, either for a ransom payment for the release of captive seafarers, theft of cargo or both. Some seafarers have been held hostage for several years.

海上海盗袭击和武装抢劫事件是世界许多地方普遍存在的有组织的、持续不断的犯罪活动。袭击者往往具有攻击性，使受害者遭受暴力和虐待。船只被劫持，既有为了索取释放被俘海员的赎金，也有为盗窃货物，或者两者兼而有之。有一些海员已被扣为人质多年。

Experience shows that applying the recommendations in this guidance will assist ships to detect, avoid, deter or delay attacks.

经验表明，应用本指南中的建议将有助于船舶去发现（识别）、避免、阻止或延迟攻击。

Not all mitigation measures in this guidance will be applicable to every ship type or in every region. Companies, CSOs and Masters should use this guidance when conducting threat and risk assessments.

本指南中的所有缓解措施并非适用于每种船型或每个区域。在进行威胁和风险评估时，公司、公司安全员和船长应该使用这一指南。

The purpose of this guidance is to protect seafarers, the ship and cargo and, to facilitate threat and risk assessment and planning for voyages transiting areas where the threat of attack by pirates and armed robbers exists.

本指南的目的是保护海员、船舶和货物，并促进对存在海盗和武装强盗袭击威胁的航行过境地区的威胁和风险评估和规划。

This guidance consists of: 指南组成：

- General advice and recommendations that are common to mitigate against attack by pirates and armed robbers;
  一般建议及推荐，以减缓海盗及武装劫匪的袭击；

- Guidance on threat and risk assessment, planning and the implementation of self-protection measures; and
  对威胁和风险评估、规划和实施自我保护措施的指南，以及

- Appendix A providing information on other security threats and the fundamental requirements and recommendations to ensure that companies and ships can respond to those threats in a proportionate and dynamic way.

附录A提供有关其他安全威胁的信息，以及确保公司和船舶能够以适当和动态方式应对这些威胁的基本要求和建议。

- Annexes providing information on regions where there is a risk of piracy and armed robbery and where prior planning and preparation before transiting the region is recommended.

附件提供关于哪个区域有海盗和武装抢劫危险，以及在过境相应区域前事先规划和准备的资料的建议。

This guidance is complementary to other industry regional guidance and that issued by international regional organisations such as the Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia produced by ReCAAP ISC in collaboration with other regionalorganisations.

本指南是其他行业的补充区域指导和签发等国际区域组织区域指导反海盗及持械抢劫船只在亚洲由ReCAAP ISC与其他区域合作组织。

This guidance also complements guidance on piracy and armed robbery provided in the latest IMO MSC Circulars (see the IMO website at www.imo.org) and should be seen as complementary to IMO MSC.1/Circ.1334 as amended.

本指南也补充指导海盗及持械抢劫中提供最新的国际海事组织MSC通告（见国际海事组织网站www.imo.org)和应被视为补充IMO MSC.1/Circ.1334修正案。

Other sources of information include:

其他信息资源包括：

Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website (www.mschoa.org),

海事安全中心–非洲好望角网站

UKMTO (www.ukmto.org)

英国海上贸易组织

NATO Shipping Centre (www.shipping.nato.int)北约海运中心

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre web site (https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre 国际海事局海盗报告中心

Information Fusion Centre Singapore (www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg)

ReCAAP website (www.recaap.org).新加坡信息融合技术中心

Nothing in this guidance detracts from the Master's overriding authority and responsibility to protect the crew, ship, and cargo.

本指南无任何有损船长行使高于一切的保护船员, 船和货物的权力和责任。

A review of the guidance will be carried out by the authors after one year and thereafter bi-annually. Unless there is an immediate and urgent issue requiring change.

一年后，编者们将对指南进行审查，此后每两年进行一次审查。除非有必须立即修改的紧急的情况。

Other maritime security threats 其他海事安全威胁

Whilst this guidance has been developed for the specific purposes of mitigation against attack by pirates and armed robbers, experience has shown that the some of the procedures and measures described can be applied to mitigate against other maritime security threats, depending on the threat profile.

同时本指南发展了减轻针对不同定目的的被海盗和武装劫匪攻击预案。经验表明，根据威胁情形不同，描述的一些处理程序和措施也可用于减轻其他海上安全威胁。

Appendix A provides guidance on other security threats to assist companies, CSOs and Masters in identifying and preparing for other maritime security threats that may be encountered during a voyage, and identifying the resources by which they can assess the risk to the ship and crew and identify measures to avoid and mitigate against the threat in the event that it materialises.

附录A提供协助公司、安全员及船长识别和准备在航行中遭遇的其他海事安全威胁。并且可通过对船舶、船员以及识别的措施的评估来识别游泳队资源，避免和减轻突然突发事件的威胁。

SECTION 2

Piracy and armed robbery against ships worldwide

全球范围内的海盗和武装劫持船舶

Pirates and armed robbers are known to conduct attacks from small fast craft and skiffs, sometimes launched from motherships, which are easier to operate in relatively calm sea conditions. It should be noted that in general, the calmer the sea state, the greater the risk of attack.

海盗和武装劫掠者被认为是通过小型快艇和小艇进行攻击, 有时从母舰上释放, 在相对平静的海面条件下更容易操作。应该注意的是, 总的来说, 海面越平静, 受攻击的风险越大。

Piracy and armed robbery most often occurs in the areas described on the following admiralty maritime security charts:

海盗及武装抢劫最常发生在下述海军部海上安全海图（即英国皇家海图）描述的水域：

- The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) –Q6099 (see Annex A)
- The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) –Q6114 (see Annex B)
- SE Asia (SEA) – Q6112, Q6113 (see Annex C)

LIMITS OF MARITIME SECURITY CHARTS

| Q6099 | 20°S - 31°N, 31°E - 80°E | Q6111 | 15°N - 31°N, 47° 40E - 70°E | Q6113 | 16° 53S - 26°N, 130°E - 146° 39E |
| Q6110 | 27°N - 47° 30N, 15°W - 42°E | Q6112 | 15° 07S - 25°N, 65°E - 118°E | Q6114 | 25°S - 23°N, 25° 30W - 18° 30E |

The areas covered by the charts should not be regarded as exhaustive – piracy and armed robbery is a dynamic International crime which may affect other areas. In the event of piracy and armed robbery emerging as a persistent threat in other regions, this guidance will be updated accordingly. The industry website www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org should be viewed for the latest regional guidance.

图表所涵盖的范围不应视为详尽无遗—海盗和武装抢劫是一项动态的国际犯罪，也可能侵袭其他地区。如果海盗和武装抢劫成为其他地区持续存在的威胁，本指南将做相

应更新。可登陆行业网站www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org应该查看最新的海盗活动区域指南。

These charts provide guidance including details of information sharing and voluntary reporting and, should be used in conjunction with this guidance. Notices to Mariners will advise of changes.

这些海图提供了指南，包括信息共享和自愿报告的详细信息，应该与指南结合起来使用。航海通告将告知变化。

The charts also provide details of Maritime Security Voluntary Reporting Areas (VRAs) and reporting and registration requirements which ships should adhere to. This ensures that military forces in the region are aware of the ship's passage plan, and its vulnerability to attack.

这些海图还提供了海事安全自愿报告区域（VRAs）的详细信息，以及船舶应遵守的报告和登记要求。这确保了该地区的军事力量知道这艘船的通过计划，以及它易受攻击的弱点。

The latest information on locations within a VRA where pirates are likely to operate can be obtained from the sources listed in the annexes prior to completing the threat and risk assessments (see section 4). It is also important ships are prepared to respond at short notice to avoid attack when information is provided by navigational warnings (Navtex), Inmarsat Safety Net Broadcasts and/or Naval/ Military forces.

在完成威胁和风险评估（section 4）前，自愿报告区域内可能遭受海盗袭击的最新位置信息可以从附件中资源列表中获得。同样重要的是船只在接收到来自Navtex 、国际海事卫星安全网络广播和/或海军军事力量的通知后可以在短时间内做出反应，以避免受到攻击。

Information is also available through International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC), which is an independent, not for profit and non-governmental agency providing a 24-hour manned service to shipmasters and ship owners to report any incident of piracy and armed robbery occurring anywhere in the world.

国际海事局海盗报告中心（以下简称"IMB PRC"）亦提供有关资料。该中心是一个独立的、非盈利的非政府机构，为船长和船东提供24小时有人值班服务，报告世界各地发生的海盗及持械抢劫事件。

Joint War Committee Listed Area 联合作战委员会列出的区域

The insurance community lists an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships entering the area would need to notify theirinsurers and additional insurance premiums may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloyd's and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of all JWC listed areas can be found on their website:

保险界列出了该区域的一个认为风险增强的区。进入该地区的船舶需要通知其保险公司，并可能需要额外的保险费。联合战争委员会（JWC）由劳氏船级社和国际承保协会的承保代表组成，他们代表了在伦敦航运市场上从事海上船壳和战争险业务人的利益。

www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar

SECTION 3

Voluntary Reporting 自愿报告

A major lesson learnt from operations against piracy and armed robbery to date is the importance of liaison with the military and law enforcement. This is an essential part of self-protection that applies to all ships. To ensure these forces are aware of the intended sea passage and to understand the ships' vulnerability to an attack, ships are encouraged to report to the centres overseeing the Voluntary Reporting Areas (VRAs). This information is essential to enable the centres to best use any assets available to them and to assist in an emergency. Once ships have entered a VRA it is important that they continue to report while transiting within the area. This will allow the reporting centres to update the ship of any maritime security related incidents or threats in that region. The four key centres are as below:

迄今为止，从打击海盗和武装抢劫的行动中得到的一个重要教训是与军方和执法部门保持联系的重要性。这是适用于所有船只的自我保护的至关重要部分。为确保这些部队了解预期的海上通道，并了解船舶易受攻击的弱点，鼓励船舶向自愿报告区（VRAs）的监督中心报告。这些资料对于使各中心能够最优利用其现有的任何资产和在紧急情况下提供协助是必不可少的。一旦船只进入VRA，船舶的持续报告很重要。这将让报告中心能够更新该区域船舶任何海上安全相关事故或威胁。四个关键的中心如下：

- For the Western Indian Ocean, the MSCHOA and UKMTO voluntary registration and reporting scheme in the WIO (chart Q6099). It is extremely important CSOs and Masters understand the differences outlined in this chart and those below. A specific and detailed High Risk Area (HRA) is outlined and there are important reporting procedures to be followed in order to monitor and give guidance at short notice on threats in the HRA. Ship reporting is the major indicator to MSCHOA on the level of implementation of BMPs and the only area where it is monitored to this extent. See Annex A for further detail.

  在西印度洋，MSCHOA和UKMTO在WIO的自愿登记和报告计划（图Q6099）。安全员和船长清楚这张图表/海图和下面概述的那些差异是非常重要的。一个具体而详细的高风险领域（HRA）被概括，并且重要的报告程应该被遵守，以便监控者在短时间内对HRA中的威胁提供指导。船舶报告是MSCHOA在实施最佳管理措施方面的主要指标，也是对其进行这方面监测的唯一领域。详见附件A。

- For the Gulf of Guinea, the MDAT-GOG voluntary registration and reporting scheme (Admiralty chart Q6114 and French Navy Hydrographic SHOM Chart 8801CS). It is strongly encouraged that the reporting requests for information are implemented by all ships transiting the VRA. See Annex B for further detail.

  对于几内亚湾，MDAT-GOG（海洋领域贸易意识-几内亚湾）自愿登记和报告计划（海军部海图Q6114和法国海军海道图SHOM图8801CS）。强烈鼓励所有通过VRA的船舶实施报告要求提供的信息。详见附件B。

- For South East Asia, the Singapore Information Fusion Centre (IFC) voluntary community reporting scheme (charts Q6112 and Q6113). This VRA is extremely large and should be considered in conjunction with the listed 'areas of concern'.

The differences between the transit reporting guidance to the IFC and requirements for immediate incident reporting and procedures as highlighted by ReCAAP ISC, should be noted carefully by Masters and CSOs. See Annex C for further detail.

关于东南亚，新加坡信息融合中心（IFC）自愿社区报告计划（图Q6112和Q6113）。这个VRA非常大，应该与列出的"关注的领域"一起考虑。对于IFC过境报告指南与ReCAAP ISC所强调的立即事故报告和程序要求之间的差异，安全员和船长应予以认真关注。详见附件C。

The Admiralty Charts referenced above provide the mariner withmaritime security reporting information to compliment effectivevoyage planning through the regions. Due to the risk of piracyand armed robbery, and the complexity of security threats in theregions, the Admiralty Charts should be used in conjunction withAdmiralty Notices to Mariners, Safetynet Service warnings andNavtex messages. The VRAs as shown on the charts clearly definean area, so that companies and shipstransiting, trading or operatingin these regions can join a trusted reporting scheme.

上述海军图为海员提供海上安全报告信息，用来有效的实施穿过报告区的航行计划。由于海盗和武装抢劫的风险，以及该地区安全威胁的复杂性，海军部海图应配合海军部向海员发出的通告、安全网络服务警告和Navtex报文一起使用。如图所示，VRAs清楚地划定了一个区域，以便在该区域贸易或运营公司和途经的船舶可以加入一个可信赖的报告计划。

Positional data, suspicious activity and incidents reported byshipping in the VRAs, using the forms on the Charts, assist in thecreation of a detailed and accurate regional maritime securitypicture. The analysis is used to produce security recommendationsthat are shared with seafarers, companies and law enforcement agencies to improve threat awareness and, incident response.

VRAs中的船舶使用图表上的表格报告位置数据、可疑行为和事件，有助于创建详细和准确的海上安全区域图片。分析是用于生产与海员共享的安全建议，公司和执法机构来改善危机意识，和事件响应。

Ships are strongly encouraged to register and report with therespective reporting centres as appropriate and, then send regularreports.

我们强烈鼓励船舶在适当情况下向有关报告中心登记和报告，然后定期发送报告。

Section 4
Company Threat and Risk Assessment
公司威胁和风险评估

This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the CSO and Master in cooperation to identify the appropriate Ship Protection Measures to be applied to a voyage through an area or areas of risk from piracy and armed robbery.

这一节详细说明了CSO（公司保安员）和船长合作应采取的程序，以确定在通过一个或几个海盗和持械抢劫危险地区航行时应采取的适当的船舶保护措施。

Threat assessment 威胁评估

The threat assessment should include threats of piracy and armed robbery so that its output will inform the risk assessment.

威胁评估应包括海盗威胁和武装抢劫威胁，以便其输出将通知风险评估。

A threat is formed of intent, opportunity and capability. Intent and capability cannot be mitigated by masters or CSOs. Therefore, mitigation against the opportunity for an attack is the focus of this guidance, risk assessments and any subsequent SPMs.

"威胁"是由意图、机会和能力组成。船长和安全员无法减轻其意图和能力。因此，减少对方攻击机会是本指南、风险评估和任何后续船舶保护措施（SPMs）的重点。

In the context of piracy and armed robbery, capability means that attackers have the physical means to conduct an attack, intent is demonstrated by continued attacks, opportunity is what is mitigated by the company, ship and crew through application of the measures described in this guidance.

在海盗和武装抢劫情况下，"能力"意味着攻击者有实施攻击的物理手段，"意图"通过持续的攻击来表现，"机会"是公司、船舶和船员通过应用本指南中描述的措施来减轻威胁，赢得机会。

In addition to the information provided in this guidance, supplementary information about the characteristics of the threat, specific or new tactics, and regional

background factors may be sought from Regional Reporting Centres and Organisations as listed in the sources detailed at the annexes, Shipping Associationwebsites, commercial intelligence providers or local sources e.g. ships' agents.

除了在本指南提供的信息，威胁的特点，具体的或新的战术，和区域背景因素的辅助信息可以从区域报告中心和附录详细列出的运输协会网站、商业情报提供者等组织或当地来源如船的代理处寻求。

Risk Assessment 风险评估

Risk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system. All voyages require thorough advanced planning and risk assessment using all available information. The risk being evaluated should include likelihood of harm to the crew or ship from attack by pirates and armed robbers.

The risk assessment must reflect the prevailing characteristics of the specific voyage, ship and operations and not just be a repetition of advice e.g. relating to different geographical regions and different pirate modus operandi. Detailed guidance on preparing risk assessments can be found from a variety of sources including the ISPS code.

风险评估是安全管理系统中航次计划的一个组成部分。所有航行都需要预先使用所有可用信息进行全面的计划和风险评估。评估的风险应包括船员或船舶受到海盗和武装劫匪袭击的可能性。风险评估必须反映特定航次、船舶和作业的特有特点，而不仅仅是重复建议，例如涉及不同的地理区域和不同的海盗作业方式。对准备风险评估有详细的指导。

4.1 Risk assessment considerations for the Company

公司的风险评估注意事项

Like the Ship Security Assessment described in the ISPS Code, the risk assessment for the risk of piracy and armed robbery should include, but may not be limited to, the following:

与ISPS规则所描述的船舶安全评估一样，海盗和持械抢劫风险评估应包括但不限于以下内容：

■ The threat and potential areas of increased risk (who are the pirates or armed robbers, what do they want to achieve, how do they attack, how do they board, which weapons do they use etc.) Companies should use the sources listed at the annexes to do this.

风险增加的威胁和潜在区域（谁是海盗或武装强盗，他们想要达到什么目标，他们如何攻击，他们如何登船，他们使用什么武器等等）公司应该使用附录中列出的来源来完成风险评估。

■ Background factors shaping the situation (likely visibility, sea-state, traffic patterns e.g. other commercial ships, local patterns of life including fishermen and, other local maritime crime).

影响局势的背景因素（可能的能见度、海况、交通模式，例如其他商船、当地生存模式包括渔民和其他本地海上犯罪）。

- Co-operation with military or other security services where such missions exist.
  与有类似任务的军方或其他安全服务机构几个合作

- The ship's characteristics/vulnerabilities/inherent capabilities to withstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement etc.).
  船舶特性/弱点/以抵抗威胁的固有性能（干舷、速度、总体布置等）。

- The ship's and Company's procedures (drills, watch rosters, chain of command, decision making processes etc.).
  船舶和公司的程序（演习、人员名册、指挥系统、决策过程等）。

The risk assessment should take into consideration any statutory requirements, in particular those of the flag and/or the coastal State.

风险评估应考虑到所有的法律要求，尤其时船旗国和/或沿岸国的规定。

A key output of any risk assessment process should identify whether additional mitigation measures are required to prevent attack.

任何风险评估过程的关键输出都应该识别是否需要额外的缓解措施来防止攻击。

Section 5

Company Planning 公司计划

5.1 Company planning prior to entering an area of increased risk

进入风险增加的威胁区域前的公司计划

This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the company prior to a ship entering an area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment in order to mitigate against the risk of attack. It should be noted that pirate and armed robbery risk will vary across regions.

本节介绍公司在船舶进入经风险评估识别出风险增加的区域之前应采取细化的程序，用以减轻攻击风险。值得注意的是，海盗和武装抢劫的风险在不同地区各不相同。

5.1.1 Register ship with relevant reporting centre

向相关报告中心登记船舶信息

It is strongly recommended that companies register for access to all websites offering additional and updated information prior to entering an area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment. For example, the restricted section of the MSCHOA website and, the UKMTO website contain additional and updated information. Note that this is not the same as registering a ship's movement – see below.

强烈建议公司在进入通过风险评估确定的风险增加的领域之前，注册访问所有提供额外和最新信息的网站。例如，MSCHOA网站和UKMTO网站的受限部分包含额外的和最新的信息。请注意，这与注册船舶的移动是不同的——见下文。

5.1.2 Obtain latest threat and risk information from designated regional sources

从指定的区域来源获得最新的威胁和风险信息

Great care should be taken in voyage planning and the company should obtain the latest threat information from the relevant websites (see the annexes as appropriate).

在制定航次计划时要非常谨慎，公司应该从相关网站获取最新的威胁信息（见附件）。

5.1.3 Review Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and Ship Security Plan (SSP)

复审船舶保安评估和船舶保安计划

After completing the risk assessment, the company should review the ship security assessment and implementation of the ship security plan, ensuring that any necessary follow-up actions are taken as appropriate.

在完成风险评估后，公司应审查船舶安全评估和船舶安全计划的执行情况，确保采取适当的后续行动。

5.1.4 Put ship protection measures in place

把船舶保护措施落实到位

The company should ensure the SSP highlights where and when SPMs and vessel hardening are to be in place for passage throughan area of increased risk and, that this is exercised, briefed and discussed with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

公司应确保船舶保安计划（SSP）被重点关注，强调不管在任何时间任何地点只要船舶穿过风险增加区域，均应与船长和船舶保安员（SSO)进行演练、通报和讨论，将强化的船舶保护措施落实到位。

5.1.5 Monitor piracy related websites for current threats

跟踪相关防海盗网站了解当前的威胁

Ensure that crews are briefed of any threats of piracy and armed robbery which may be encountered during the voyage. Company procedures should stipulate masters to monitor all NAV WARNINGS – SAT C (NAVTEXT in limited areas) as appropriate. (see the annexes as appropriate).

确保船员了解航行期间可能发生的任何海盗袭击及武装抢劫事件。公司的程序应规定船长在限制区域应尽可能监控所有的航行警告-SAT C(NAVTEXT)（见相应的附录）

5.1.6 Offer guidance to the Master as to recommended route

为船长提供推荐的航路指南

Offer the Master guidance regarding recommended routeing through areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment. Guidance should be provided on using recommended transit corridors or other supported routes (e.g. a Group Transit or National Convoys where these exist). If anchoring, consideration should be given to the use of protected anchorages where available recognising that standards of protection vary widely. The company should appreciate that the voyage routeing may need to be reviewed and amended at short notice in light of updated information.

对通过风险评估识时别出风险增加的区域提供给船长推荐的航线。指南中应提供关于使用推荐的过境走廊或其他有支持的路线（例如，组队通过或有军舰护航）。如果是锚泊，应考虑使用经认可可用的，且保护标准范围广泛的受保护的锚地。公司应认识到，航行路线可能需要在短时间内根据最新信息进行复查和更新。

5.1.7 Plan to maintain security of critical information

维护安全及关键性信息计划

To avoid critical information falling into the wrong hands, consideration should be given to ensuring that:

为避免关键信息落入坏人之手，应确保遵循如下原则：

■ Communications with external parties are kept to a minimum with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting positions; and

尽量减少与外界的沟通，并密切留意集结地点及等候位置的安排；和

- Email correspondence to agents, charterers and chandlers should be controlled and information within the email kept concise, containing the minimum information that is contractually required.

  与代理、租家和供应商的电子邮件通信应该受到控制，电子邮件中的信息应保持简洁，尽量包含合同要求的最少信息。

5.2 Company planning on entering an area of increased risk
公司计划进入风险增加的区域

Ensure that the appropriate registration and/or reporting forms have been submitted in accordance with the applicable reporting recommendations

确保已按照推荐的报告形式递交合适的注册和/或报告格式进行报告

Section 6

Ship Master's planning 船长的计划

6.1 Ship Master's planning prior to entering areas of increased risk
进入风险增加区域前的船长计划

This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the ship's Master prior to a ship entering an area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, in order to mitigate against the risk of attack.

未来减少袭击风险，本章将提供船长在船舶进入经评估存在风险增加的区域时必需采取程序的详细说明。

6.1.1 Implement SPMs 实施船舶安全保护措施

SPMs should be implemented as determined through the risk assessment.
通过风险评估确定实施的安全保护措施

6.1.2 Brief crew, check equipment and conduct drills
装备检查和演习

Crew should be briefed on the necessary security arrangements identified in the SSP. Drills should be conducted prior to arrival in an area of increase risk as identified through the risk assessment. Drills should be unannounced, to ensure crew respond appropriately in the event of an actual attack. If necessary, drills should be repeated in order to improve response times. Personnel should be briefed on their duties, including ensuring familiarity with the alarm signal indicating an attack, an all-clear signal and the appropriate response to each. Consideration should also be given to the following:

应向船员简要介绍在船舶保安计划中识别出的必要保安布置。应在进入风险评估识别出的风险增加区域之前组织演练。演习应该在没有通知的情况下进行，以确保船员在发生实际攻击时做出适当反应。如有必要，应反复演练以缩短响应时间。每个船员应简要介绍各自职责，包括确保熟悉表示攻击的警报信号、每个警报信号对应的适当响应。此外，亦应考虑如下：

1. Testing the SPMs and physical security including all access points.
   测试船舶保护措施及物理安全包括所有的入口

2. Removing unnecessary equipment from the upper deck.
   从甲板上移除不必要的设备

3. Securing the accommodation block.
   生活区安全的障碍物

4. Testing Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) (giving prior warning).
   保安测试（提前告知）

5. Testing all communications equipment, alarms, etc.

测试所有通讯设备，报警等

6. Testing all deck lights and search lights.

    测试甲板照明和探照灯

Ensure that crew members will not be trapped inside a ship, during an attack or during an emergency for example fire or flooding.

确保船员在受到攻击或如火灾或水淹等紧急情况下，不会被困在船内。

The location of any Safe Muster Point and/or Citadel should be known to all crew members. This location should only be shared with relevant third parties such as military or law enforcement authorities responding to an incident. The location should not be shared freely with any third party e.g. port authorities, stevedores, etc.

所有船员都应知道任何安全集结点和/或避难所的位置。此位置只应与事件响应的军方或执法部门等相关第三方共享。该地点不应与任何如港口当局、码头/租家等第三方随意分享。

6.1.3 Emergency Communication Plan 应急联系计划

Masters are advised to ensure that an Emergency Communication Plan has been developed in accordance with the risk assessment, that includes all essential emergency contact numbers and prepared messages, and which should be ready or permanently displayed near all external communications stations (e.g. telephone numbers of regional centres, CSO, IMB PRC etc.).

建议船长根据风险评估确保建立一份紧急联系计划, 包括所有至关重要的紧急联系号码和准备好的信息, 并应准备好或永久张贴在所有对外通信站台附近（例如区域应急中心的电话号码、公司安全员、国际海事局防海盗报告中心等）。

6.1.4 Automatic Identification System 自动识别系统

It is recommended, subject to frequent assessment, that Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmission is left on throughout any and all areas of risk, but that it is configured to transmit ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety-related information only. It should be recognised that certain flag and/or coastal State regulations can require AIS to be left on.

在反复评估的情况下，建议自动识别系统(AIS)在任何和风险区域都保持工作状态，但设置为只传输船舶的识别号、位置、航向、速度、航行状态和安全相关信息。应认识到，某些船旗国和/或沿海国法规可能要求继续使用AIS设备。

6.1.5 Define the ship's Ship-to-ship Transfer (STS)/Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) policy 定义船靠船过驳（STS）/单点系泊（SBM）

The following should be considered when planning Ship-to-ship Transfer (STS)/ Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) :

当计划STS/SBM操作时，应考虑如下因素：

1. During an STS operation it is essential that the lookout is coordinated between the tankers and any standby ships. This is particularly important as there may be restrictions on operating radar during an STS operation.

    在STS作业中，必须在油轮之间和任何备用船之间协调了望。这一点特别重要，因

为在STS操作期间可能会限制使用雷达设备。

2. Consideration should be given to the issuing of hand held night vision optics to assist with the identification and early warning of unidentified small craft.

   晚上应考虑利用手持夜视光学仪器，以协助识别和早期预警小型不明飞行器。

3. When conducting STS operations it is recommended that the Master establishes communications with the shore authority regardless of where the STS is taking place, but that contractor/agent communication should be as late as possible in the proceedings. All communications should be kept to a minimum to prevent unauthorised receipt of information.

   在进行STS作业时，无论STS在何处进行都建议船长与沿岸当局建立通信联系，但与租家/代理的通信应尽可能推迟。为防止非法接收信息，接收所有通信都应保持在最低限度，。

4. Consider the use of protected anchorages where available recognising that standards of protection vary widely.

   考虑使用受保护的锚地，要认识到不同的保护标准差别很大。

5. Consideration should be given to radar watches, Lighting arrangements and the notice for getting underway.

   应考虑雷达值守、照明安排和开航通知

Use of codewords may be considered appropriate if it is believed that communications are likely to be compromised.

如果认为通信可能受到监听，那么使用密码联系可能被认为是适当的。

6.2 Ship Master's planning on entering an area of increased risk

船长计划进入风险增加区域

This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the Master on the ship's entry into an area of increased risk as identified through the risk assessment and during transit in order to mitigate against the risk of attack. When transiting areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, further briefing and checks are likely to be required prior to entering them.

本节详细说明了船长在船舶进入通过风险评估识别出的风险增加区域时和过境过程中应采取的程序，以减少攻击风险。在风险评估确定风险增加的区域中过境时，可能要求在进入这些区域之前进行进一步的任务简报和检查。

6.2.1 Submit initial Ship Position Report Form

递交船舶初始位置报告的形式

If the voyage includes the transit of a VRA the Master should submit a "Ship Movement Registration" form to the relevant reporting centre (see the annexes as appropriate).

如果船舶航次计划中包括过境自愿报告区（VRA），船长应向有关的报告中心提交"船舶动态登记"表格（请参阅有关附件）

6.2.2 Implement the measures required by the risk assessment

执行通过风险评估要求实施的相关措施

The Master should ensure that the measures identified in the risk assessment have been effectively implemented.

船长应确保在风险评估中识别出的措施得到有效的执行

6.2.3 Implement the Communications Policy 执行通讯联系政策

Master and Crew should ensure critical information does not fall into the wrong hands e.g. to protect the release of sailing times and routeing information (see section 5.1.7).

Consideration should be given to minimising the use of VHF. Use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF radio, bearing in mind that imposters are possible.

船长及船员应确保关键的信息不会落入坏人之手，如受保护的开航时间和航路信息等受保护信息的发布（见section 5.1.7）。

6.2.4 Maintenance and engineering work should be undertaken within any restrictions imposed by the voyage risk assessment

维修保养和机修作业应在航次风险评估规定的任何限制范围内进行

When operating in areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment – the following should be considered:

当在风险评估识别出的风险增加区域营运是，应考虑如下：

1. Any work outside of the accommodation is strictly controlled and similarly access points limited and controlled;
    任何室外工作应严格控制，同理严格及控制生活区入口；

2. All Engine Room essential equipment to be immediately available;
    机舱所有重要设备均应处于随时可用状态；

3. No maintenance on essential equipment.
    无重要设备处于维护保养状态

6.2.5 Carefully review all warnings and information

认真检查所有的警告及信息

The Master (and company) should appreciate that the voyage routeing may need to be reviewed in light of updated information received. This information and warnings may be provided by a number of different means, including navigational warnings – Sat C (and NAVTEXT in limited areas) as well as direct messaging in certain areas. It is important all warnings and information are carefully reviewed.

船长（公司）应重视航线可能需要根据接收的更新信息重新评审。该信息和警告可能是通过各种方式提供，包括航行警告-卫星C站（及, 在限制区域使用NAVTEXT发送），在某些特定区域可能是直接发送信息。所有的警告和信息都应认真评估，这一点非常重要。

6.2.6 Consider speed and manoeuvring 速度和机动性考虑

Increasing speed makes it difficult for an attacker to board. Engines should be ready for immediate manoeuvre. The passage speed of the ship will be determined by the risk assessment. Consider planning on increasing ship speed, particularly if there is a low

freeboard. Ships should spend as little time as possible stationary, drifting or operating at low speeds – especially when working inshore. If stationary, the use of protected anchorages should be considered, where available, recognising that standards of protection vary widely.

速度的增加使得袭击者登轮难度加大。发动机应准备好可随时机动操纵。船舶通过的速度将由风险评估决定。考虑提高船舶航速的计划，特别是在干舷较低的情况下。船舶应该尽可能少地停留、漂航或低速航行——尤其是在近海作业时。如果停航，应该考虑进入受保护的锚地。要认识到，不同的保护标准差别很大。

- The ability to get underway and/or increase to a maximum safe speed as quickly as possible when operating in areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment is required is of the utmost importance. This will open the distance from any possible attack and make the ship more difficult to board.

  在由风险评估确定的风险增加的水域航行时，船舶具备尽快启动和/或提高到最大安全速度的能力至关重要。这将拉开与任何可能的袭击者的距离，并增加登船难度。

- Manoeuvring away from a threat if detected at range increases the time taken for the attacking vessel to close its distance from the ship. Similarly making best use of sea conditions to create the most difficult transit conditions for small craft is another option. Aggressive manoeuvring when a small boat is close to or alongside makes the use of ladders and climbing ropes more difficult for the pirates.

  如果探测到一定范围内增加的时间 如果在一定距离范围内探测到威胁，应立即机动远离，增加了攻击船接近目标的时间。同样，最好灵活地利用海况增加小型船舶接近的难度是另一种选择。当一艘小船靠近或在大船旁边时，船舶采取的主动攻击性动作会使海盗们更难使用梯子和攀爬绳索登船。

Freeboard干舷

- A ship underway is most easily boarded at the lowest point of its freeboard. Additional SPMs should be used to deny pirates access at these points.

  船舶航行途中，从干舷最低点登轮更容易

- A ship's freeboard height may change during a voyage. When changes in freeboard occur the effectiveness of SPMs will need to be considered during the risk assessment.

  船舶航行时干舷高度会改变，当发生干舷高度改变时，在风险评估时应考虑船舶的有效保护措施（SPMs）。

Location and time at anchor 锚泊的地点和时间

- Keep time at anchor to a minimum where possible.

  尽可能缩短锚泊时间

- Consider appropriate use of lighting (see section 8.10).

  考虑使用适当的照明（间section8.10）

- Consider use of "safe anchorages" where they are provided. Information on safe anchorages is provided in local Notice to Mariners or Admiralty Charts (see Annexes).

如果有的话，考虑使用"安全锚地"。安全锚地信息通常在当地的航海通告或英国皇家海图中提供（间附录）

- The location of the anchorage, STS operation and SBM are also important factors in mitigating risks against attacks on the ship. Ships are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor, carrying out Ship to Ship (STS) transfer, ship's ballast management operations or, slowing down for pilot transfer.

  锚地位置、STS作业和SBM的位置选择也是减轻遭受攻击风险的重要因素。船舶在停航、漂航、抛锚、进行船对船过驳、船舶压载管理作业或慢速接送引水时最易受影响。

Coordinated arrival协调抵达

- Passage plans should be designed to result in arrival at a pilot station 'just in time' to avoid drifting or waiting in a vulnerable area. Many ships wait offshore and transit to meet the pilot at high speed. A period of high vulnerability is when the ship slows down to embark the pilot. Tendering early notice of readiness can be beneficial to prevent unnecessary loitering or drifting.

  航次计划应设计为"及时"到达引航站，以避免在易受攻击的区域漂航或等待。许多船只在离岸处等待并快速通过以满足引水员要求。一段极易受攻击的阶段是当船慢下来接引水上船。提前发出准备就绪通知有助于防止不必要的徘徊或漂流。

- Do not drift. Avoid being underway without making way.

  不要漂航，避免在航行途中无路可走

Sea State海面情况

Attackers are known to conduct attacks from small fast craft, sometimes from motherships, which are easier to operate in more benign conditions. The calmer the sea state, the greater the risk of attack.

众所周知，袭击者会从小型快艇发起攻击，有时会从母船发起攻击，这样在更温和的条件下更容易操作。海面越平静，受到攻击的风险越大。

6.2.7 Increase vigilance during STS/SBM operations操作期间增加警戒

The STS/SBM policy should be fully implemented (See section 6.1.5).

STS/SBM政策应充分执行（section 6.1.5）

6.2.8 Submit daily position report to relevant reporting centre

提交每日位置报告给相关报告中心

When operating inside a VRA, ships are strongly encouraged to report daily relevant reporting centre by email/fax whilst operating within a VRA.

船舶在自愿报告区营运是，强烈鼓励船舶通过email/fax每日向相关报告中心报告。

6.2.9 Consider utilisation of Convoy systems where available

如果位置方便考虑利用护航系统

In certain areas of risk military forces may offer assistance in the form of group transits and national convoys.

在某些危险地区，可以由政府军舰协助护送船队通过

Section 7

Ship protection measures (SPM)

船舶保护措施

7.1 Introduction 介绍

This section focuses on measures that can be taken by the ship's crew to mitigate against attack.

本章关注的焦点是船员能够采取减少袭击的措施

The guidance is based on global experience of attacks by to date. Not all methods will be applicable to all regions or ship types, and the measures applied on any one ship will be dependent upon the outcome of the risk assessment.

该指南基于迄今为止的全球被攻击的经验。并不是所有的方法都适用于所有区域或所有类型船舶，任何一艘船上采取的措施均将取决于风险评估结果。

When considering ship protection measures (SPM) it is important to recognise that ships can be attacked both when underway and stationary (at anchor, carrying out STS or SBM operations or drifting).

在考虑船舶保护措施（SPM）时，重要的是要认识到船只在航行和静止时都可能受到攻击（抛锚、STS或SBM操作或漂航）。

Many companies have their own detailed guidance on ship hardening procedures – all based on their risk assessment. The risk assessment recommendations and guidance should be based upon the concept of 'Defence in Depth', and a 'Layered Defence.' The premise of this concept is that any robust security system must be resilient to partial failures and that multiple layers of defence make the system less predictable for any would-be attackers, therefore making the system more difficult to circumvent.

许多公司在船舶防御程序上都有自己的详细指导——所有这些都是基于他们的风险评估。风险评估建议和指导应基于"深度防御"和"分层防御"的概念。这一概念的前提是，任何健全的安全系统都必须对部分失误能迅速恢复，而多层防御使得系统对任何潜在的攻击者来说都不那么可预测，因此系统更难以规避。

Companies may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond the scope of this guidance, and/or provide additional equipment and/or manpower as a means of further reducing the risk of attack. If pirates and armed robbers are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it. The effective implementation of these SPMs has proven successful in deterring and/or delaying attack.

公司可考虑在本指南范围之外针对船舶进行进一步变化，和/或提供额外的设备和/或人力，作为进一步降低攻击风险的手段。如果海盗和武装劫匪无法登上一艘船，他们就不能劫持它。事实证明，有效实施这些船舶保护措施（SPMs）可成功阻止和/或延迟攻击。

下图为分层防御示意图：

第一道防线	第二道防线	最后防线
• 良好瞭望/警戒 • 防海盗钢丝网 • 机动操作 • 速度/干舷高度	• 加固的门 • 加固的窗户 • 出入口/格栅 • 运动传感器/CCTV	• 内部加固门 • 避难所 • 通讯设备

7.2 Watch keeping and enhanced vigilance 值班及加强警戒

Before entering any areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, one of the outcomes of the risk assessment is which SPMs are appropriate for the risk of attack. Preparations should be made to support increased vigilance by:

在进入任何通过风险评估确定风险增加的区域之前，风险评估的目的是选择更适合应对相应攻击风险的护措施。应做好准备，通过以下提高警戒级别：

■ Providing additional lookouts for each Watch. When stationary crew should be monitoring the water around the ship – it is essential that an all-round lookout is maintained from an elevated position. The lookout team should keep in regular contact with the Officer of the Watch.

为每班增加瞭望人员。当停航时船员应该监视船泊周围的水域，从高处保持全方位的监视至关重要。瞭望班组应定期与值班的高级船员保持联系。

■ Considering a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize alertness of the lookouts.

考虑用更短的瞭望轮换周期，以最大限度地提高守望者的警惕性。

■ Ensuring that lookouts are briefed by the Officer of the Watch at the start of each watch on the tactics of local pirates and armed robbers.

确保瞭望人员在每次值班前被驾驶员提前告知当地海盗及武装劫匪活动策略。

■ Maintaining sufficient binoculars for the Bridge Team, preferably anti-glare. The use of hand held thermal imagery optics, night vision aids/equipment could also be considered as they provide a reliable all-weather, day and night surveillance capability.

保持足够多的双筒望远镜供驾驶台班组使用，最好是防眩光。手持式热成像光学、夜视辅助设备/设备的使用可视为已提供可靠的全天候、昼夜监视能力。

■ Maintaining a careful Radar Watch, monitoring all Navigational Warnings and monitoring communications, particularly VHF and GMDSS alerts.

持续关注雷达值守，监控所有的航行警告和监控通讯联系，尤其VHF和GMDSS报警。

■ Well-constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the ship can give

the impression of greater numbers of crew on watch. This is very effective when stationary.

在船舶四周重要位置搭建逼真的假人，可以给出大量船员值班的印象。这在停航时非常有效。

- When in port or at anchor regular security rounds should be conducted. The accommodation ladder should be kept at main deck level and lowered when required only. A gangway watch should be maintained at all times when the accommodation ladder is lowered.

  在港口或锚泊时，应定期进行安全巡查。舷梯应保持在主甲板水平位置，只在需要时放低。当舷梯放下时，应始终保持梯口值班。

- Approaching vessels should be challenged to prove their identity before they are allowed alongside.

  接近的船只在获准挂靠本轮前，应该接受质询，并证明其身份。

- Consider enhancing already fixed technology such as CCTV for better monitoring and fixed lighting such as the ship search light. The latter has proven effective in deterring approaches from the stern.

  考虑加强已经存在的固有技术，如闭路电视，以更好地监控。以及固定式照明系统，如船舶探照灯。事实证明，后一种方法可以有效地阻止从船尾接近。

- It should be noted that lower sea states can also improve detection range of criminal craft both by radar and visually.

  值得注意的是，较低的海况也可以通过雷达和视觉瞭望来提高对罪犯小艇的探测范围。

A proper, visual lookout is the most effective method of ship protection. It can help identify a suspicious approach or attack early on, allows defences to be deployed and, can serve as an effective deterrent to would-be attackers.

合适的视觉瞭望是保护船舶最有效的方法。它可以帮助在早期识别出可疑的接近目标或攻击，留出时间做防御部署，并可以对潜在的攻击者形成有效的威慑。

7.3 Enhanced bridge protection 加强驾驶台保护

The bridge is usually the focal point of an attack. In some situations, pirates direct their weapon fire at the bridge in an attempt to try and stop the ship. If the ship is at anchor the bridge may not initially be the focus during a boarding attempt. However, if attackers are able to board the ship, they usually make for the bridge. The following protection enhancements might be considered – particularly in those areas where weapons are often used in the attack (see the annexes as appropriate)

驾驶台通常是攻击的重点。在某些情况下，海盗试图登轮或阻止这艘船前进时会将武器对准驾驶台开火。如果船在锚地，驾驶台可能不是尝试登船的最初焦点。然而，如果攻击者能够登船，他们通常会去占领驾驶台。可以考虑加强以下保护措施，特别是在攻击中经常使用武器的地区（请参阅附件）

■ Bridge windows are laminated but further protection against flying glass can be provided by the application of blast resistant film.

驾驶台的窗户是多层玻璃，但可通过使用防爆膜进一步提供防止玻璃飞溅的保护。

■ Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium) plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which can be quickly secured in place in the event of an attack can greatly reduce the risk of injury from fragmentation.

在发生攻击事件时，能快速固定在驾驶台侧后窗户和侧面门窗的金属（钢/铝）板材，可以大大降低因玻璃破碎而受伤的风险。

■ Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of rocket propelled grenades (RPG), as has the use of sandbags to protect bridge wings. Sandbags should be regularly checked to ensure that they have not degraded.

网状格栅可有效降低火箭筒威力，就像在驾驶台两翼堆放沙袋保护一样，应定期检查沙袋防止坍塌。

7.4 Control of access to bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces

控制驾驶台、生活区及机舱的入口

It is important to deny access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces, to deter or delay attackers who have managed to board a ship and, the following may be considered:

阻止或延缓已登船的袭击者，拒阻其进入驾驶台、生活区和机舱非常重要，并且可考虑下述情况：

- Escape routes must be easily accessible to seafarers in the event of an emergency. If the door or hatch is locked it is essential that a key is available, in a clearly visible position by the door or hatch.

  在紧急情况下，应急逃生路径必须方便船员进入，如果门或舱口被锁闭

- All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent access by attackers.

  所有的门以及舱口/天窗均能为袭击者提供通往驾驶台、生活区及机舱的入口，所以应妥善保护，防止袭击者进入。

- It is recommended once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used for security patrols and routine access. The use of these doors or hatches should be controlled by the Officer of the Watch.

  一旦门和舱门被固定，安全巡逻和常规通道的数量应被被指定和限制。这些门或舱口的使用应由值守的船干负责。

- Consideration should be given to blocking or lifting external ladders on the accommodation block to prevent use and to restrict external access to the bridge.

  应考虑堵塞或吊起生活区上的外部梯子，以防止和限制使用从外部进入驾驶台。

- Where doors and hatches must be closed for watertight integrity, clips should be fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing, such as with wire strops, may enhance hatch security.

  为保持水密完整性，门及舱口必须关闭，合上所有的销栓锁闭，如果必要应增加的安全措施，如用钢丝绑扎增强舱口安全性。

- Removable barriers should be used around pilot boarding points so that a ship does not need to de-rig large areas prior to arrival at ports.

  应在引航员登船点周围使用可拆除的障碍，以便船只在抵达港口之前不需要拆除大面积的装备。

- Attackers can gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the glass.

袭击者可利用舷窗或窗户进入，如果在玻璃后加装钢质栏杆，可以阻止他们通过粉碎玻璃后进入。

■ Procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be briefed to the crew and practiced prior to entering the area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment.

进入生活区、机舱和仓库的控制程序应简要告知船员，并且在在进入风险评估识别出风险增加的区域前熟悉进入程序。

7.5 Physical barriers 物理屏障

Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to ships. Physical barriers offer many options to increase the difficulty of any climb for anyone trying to board the ship.

应该使用物理屏障使登轮尽可能困难，物理屏障提供很多选项来增加任何试图攀爬登轮人的困难。

■ Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only when securely deployed. Selection of appropriate razor wire is important as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and type will vary considerably – lower quality razor wire is less effective.

刀片钢丝网（也称做钢刺带）建立一个有效的障碍，但只有在做好安全部署时。选择合适的刀片非常重要，因为刀片的质量（刀片的钢丝直径和分布密度）和种类会有很大的不同——防海盗网的质量越差的刀片效果较差。

■ Concertina razor wire is recommended as the linked spirals make it the most effective barrier.

波纹管式折叠钢丝刀片被推荐用螺旋连接使其成为最有效的屏障。

■ Any wire barrier should be constructed of high tensile wire, which is difficult to cut with hand tools. Concertina razor wire coil diameters of between 730 mm or 980 mm are recommended.

任何防海盗钢丝网都应该由高强度的金属丝构成，很难用手工工具切割的。建议波纹管式防海盗网直径在730毫米或980毫米之间的。

■ When deploying razor wire personal protective equipment to protect hands, arms and faces should be used. Moving razor wire using wire hooks rather than by hand reduces the risk of injury. It is recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10 m section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which can be very heavy and unwieldy.

在使用防海盗钢丝网时，应使用个人防护设备来保护双手、手臂和面部。用钢丝钩而不是用手移动钢丝网可以降低受伤的风险。建议提供较短的分段（例如每段10米）安装刀片，因为小规格部分更容易使用，也更安全，并且较大的分段可能非常笨重。

■ A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:

如果是下述情况，坚固的防海盗钢丝网屏障是非常有效的

◆ Constructed outboard of the ship's structure (i.e. overhanging).

悬空架在船外侧四周

◆ Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire – the more rolls the more effective the barrier. The recommended minimum construction is a single high quality roll securely attached outboard of the ship's structure.

由一卷双层的波纹管状钢丝组成——圈数越多越有效。建议的最小结构是一个单根高质量钢丝圈固定在船舷边结构外侧。

◆ Properly secured to the ship to prevent attackers from pulling the razor wire off. Consideration should also be given to further securing the razor wire with a wire strop through the razor wire to prevent it being dislodged.

应适当地固定在船上，以防止袭击者将刮刀片线扯下。还应考虑用钢丝钳将刀片用钢丝进一步固定在刀片线径上，以防止刮胡刀线脱落。

◆ Razor wire should be properly maintained so that it does not become rusty. Rusty razor wire is easier to break through.

防海盗钢丝网应妥善保存防止生锈，锈蚀的钢丝网更容易破坏。

Depending on the risk assessment, the use of razor wire on the approach to a berth should be rigged as not to interfere with shipboard operations. Chocks and fairleads should be clear, and once alongside if still rigged it should not interfere with port operations; mooring/ gangways/loading/discharging. Ships generally maintain the poop area as fully razor wired for the entire period when operating in areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment.

根据风险评估，在靠近泊位的地方使用铁丝网，应有所控制，以免妨碍船上正常作业。导缆器和缆桩应该清爽，一旦靠泊，如果仍然需操纵，不应妨碍港口作业；系泊/舷梯/装货/卸货。当船舶在通过风险评估确定的风险增加的区域作业时，通常将尾楼区域保持为钢丝网布置。

Other barriers have proven effective – from hanging swinging obstacles over the gunwales to specifically designed overhanging protection which prevents boarding by climbing over the ship's rails.

其他的障碍已经被证明是有效的——从悬挂在舷边上的摇摆障碍到特别设计的悬垂保护，防止袭击者沿船舷爬上来登船。

7.6 Water spray and foam monitors 高压水柱及泡沫炮

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors is effective in deterring or delaying any attempt to illegally board a ship. The use of water can make it difficult for an unauthorized boat to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult to try to climb aboard. Water spray deterrence should be controlled remotely – manual activation at the hydrant by the crew is unsafe, especially where attackers are using firearms.

使用高压水柱和/或泡沫炮可有效地阻止或拖延任何试图非法登船的企图。水的使用会使未经许可的船只难以停留在船边，使试图爬上船变得更加困难。喷水威慑应该远程控制-船员在消防栓手动启动是不安全的，特别是在攻击者使用武器的地方。

- Fire hoses and foam monitors – It is recommended hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover likely access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and utilising baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.

  使用喷水和/或泡沫监测器有效地阻止或拖延任何非法登船的企图。水的使用会使未经许可的船只难以停留在船边，使试图爬上船变得更加困难。喷水威慑应该远程控制–船员在消防栓手动激活是不安全的，特别是在攻击者使用火器的地方。

- Water cannons deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc and protect a greater part of the hull.

  水炮在垂直的弧形范围喷水，可以保护船体的大部分区域。

- Water spray rails – Some ships have installed spray rails using a Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water curtain to cover larger areas.

  水雾轨——有些船只使用玻璃强化塑料（GRP）水总管安装了喷雾管，用喷嘴来制作水幕，覆盖更大的区域。

- Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a ship's standard Fire Fighting Equipment (FFE) stock. Foam is disorientating and very slippery, making it difficult to climb through.

  可以使用泡沫系统，但它必须是在船上标准的消防设备（FFE）的基础上的额外泡沫液。泡沫会使对方失去方向感，很滑，使袭击者很难登轮。

The following points are relevant: 相关方面

- Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended hoses and foam monitors are ready to be used, simply requiring remote activation of fire pumps to commence delivery of water.

  一旦被水柱或泡沫喷头操纵位置固定，建议使用软管和泡沫监控器，只需远程启动消防泵就可以开始输送水。

- Additional power may be required to utilise all pumps; the supporting systems

should be ready for immediate use.

当所有泵浦需要使用时可能需要额外的电力供应，支持系统应确保随时可用。

■ Practice, observation, and drills are required to ensure the equipment provides effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

需要进行练习、观察和演练，以确保设备能够有效覆盖易受攻击的区域。

7.7 Alarms 报警

Sounding the ship's alarm serves to inform the ship's crew an attack is underway. If approached, continuous sounding of the ship's whistle will distract the attackers and let them know that they have been seen. It is important that:

船舶发出声响警报，通知船员船舶正在遭受攻击。如果攻击者靠近，持续不断的汽笛声会分散他们的注意力，让他们知道其行动已被发现。尤其重要的是：

■ The alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms, potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location.

这种警报声应与众不同，避免与其他警报声混淆，防止误导船员在错误的地点集合。

■ Crew members are familiar with each alarm, especially those warning of an attack and indicating "all clear."

船员应熟悉每个警报，尤其遭受袭击的警告和"警报解除"的声号。

■ All alarms are backed up by an announcement, in the working language of the ship, over the accommodation and deck PA system.

所有的警报都以船舶工作语言在生活区和甲板PA系统上的公告作为准。

Drills should be carried out to ensure the alarm is heard throughout the ship. The drill will confirm the time necessary for all personnel to move to a position of safety.

应该进行演习，确保整个船舶能听到警报声。演习将确认所有人员转移到安全地点所需的时间。

7.8 Manoeuvring practice 机动训练

Practicing manoeuvring the ship will ensure familiarity with the ship's handling characteristics and how to use avoidance manoeuvres whilst maintaining the best possible speed. Experience has shown that such action can defeat a lengthy and determined pirate attack as creating a wash can have a better defensive impact than speed. Such manoeuvring should only be carried out when it is safe to do so taking into account the navigational situation.

船舶机动训练将确保熟悉船舶的操纵特性，以及如何避碰并确保最佳的速度。经验表明，这种行动可以击败长期和坚定的海盗攻击，因为制造波浪与速度相比可以有更好的防御效果。这种机动操纵只有在确保航行安全的情况下才可以考虑。

7.9 Closed circuit television 闭路电视

If an attack is underway and attackers are firing at the ship, it is difficult and dangerous to observe whether they have managed to gain access. The use of CCTV coverage

can allow the attack to be monitored from a less exposed position:

如果攻击正在进行，且攻击者正在向船舶开火，观察他们是否成功进入是困难和危险的。覆盖范围内的CCTV使用可以让船员从一个较少暴露的位置监视攻击者动态；

- Consider the use of CCTV cameras for coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck.

  考虑使用闭路电视摄像头来覆盖易受攻击区域，尤其是尾楼甲板

- Consider positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected position.

  考虑将闭路电视监视器安置在驾驶台后部一个受保护的位置。

- Further CCTV monitors could be located at the safe muster point/citadel.

  更多的闭路电视监视器可以定位在安全集合点/庇护所。

- Recorded CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack.

  遭袭击后闭路电视录像可以提供有用的证据。

7.10 Lighting 灯光

Navigation lights should not be switched off at night as this a contravention of international regulations. It is recommended that:

夜间不应关掉航行灯，因为这违反了国际规定。建议如下：

- In areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, consideration should be given to the appropriate level of additional lighting to be used.

  在通过风险评估确定的风险增加的区域，应该考虑使用适当水平的额外照明。

- Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the poop deck is available and tested.

  生活区周围的露天甲板照明和尾楼甲板的背对照明都可以使用和测试。

- Once attackers have been identified or an attack commences, over side lighting, if fitted, should be switched on. This will dazzle the attackers and give ships staff greater visibility.

  一旦袭击者被确认或攻击已开始，如果安装了舷侧灯，就应该打开。强光将使攻击者眼花缭乱，并使船员有更大的视野范围。

- If fitted, search lights should be ready for immediate use.

  如果安装了搜索灯，该灯应随时可用。

- At anchor, lights are left on as well-lit ships are less vulnerable to attack.

  在锚地，灯光明亮的船只不容易受到攻击

7.11 Secure Storage of ship's tools and equipment

船上工具和设备的安全存放

Tools and equipment may be of use to the attackers should be stored in a secure location.

可能对攻击者有用的工具和设备应存储在安全的位置

- Ballistic protection to gas bottles or containers of flammable liquids should be considered. Sandbags are not recommended as they degrade quickly if not maintained on a regular basis.

  应考虑对存储易燃气体或易燃液体的容器提供防止射击的保护。不建议使用沙袋，因为如果不定期维护，（破损）沙袋会很快失去作用。

- Excess gas bottles should be landed prior to transit.

  过多的存贮易燃气瓶应提前送岸。

7.13 Safe muster points and citadels

安全集合点和避难所

When operating in areas area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment careful consideration and detailed planning is critical to the safety and security of the crew. The risk assessment should identify the location of a safe muster point and/or a secure citadel within a ship must also be considered.

在通过风险评估确定的风险增加区域内作业时，对船员的安全进行认真考虑和详细规划至关重要。应通过风险评估确定船舶内安全集结点和/或安全避难所的位置。

7.13.1 Safe muster points

安全集合点

- A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection from attack by pirates and armed robbers to the crew, preferably low down within the ship. This is where crew not required on the bridge or the engine room control room will muster if the ship is under threat.

  安全集合点是一个指定的区域，用来在海盗袭击和武装劫匪袭击船员时最大程度提供物理保护，最好是在船上较低的地方。如果船舶受到威胁，不需要船员在驾驶台或机舱集控室集合船员。

- The safe muster point is a short-term safe haven, which will provide protection should the attackers commence firing weapons.

  安全集结点是一个可以保证短期安全的场所，一旦攻击者开始开火，它应该提供保护。

- Select a safe muster point protected by other locked compartments.

  选择一个通过其他锁闭的隔离舱室保护的安全集合点

7.13.2 Citadels 避难所

A citadel is a designated, pre-planned area where, in the event of imminent boarding by attackers, all crew may seek protection. A citadel is designed and constructed to resist forced entry.

避难所是一个指定的、预先规划好的地点，在攻击者即将到来的情况下，所有船员可以在这里寻求保护。设计和建造的该处所被来组织外人强行进入。

Before deciding to use a citadel, thought must be given as to how a citadel situation might end. The use of a citadel cannot guarantee a military or law enforcement

response and, the Master may have to make the decision when to end a citadel situation without the assistance of military forces.

在决定使用避难所前，必须考虑将如何结束避难的情况。避难所的使用不能保证军事或执法部门的响应，而且船长可能不得不决定在没有军队协助的情况下何时结束在安全舱室避难。

Well-constructed citadels used by a well-drilled crew can offer effective protection during an attack. If citadels are used, they must be complementary to, rather than a replacement for, all other SPM.

使用结构良好的安全舱室可以在遭遇攻击期间为训练有素的船员提供有效的保护。如果使用了该避难所，它们必须是所有其他船舶保护措施的补充，而不是替代。

The establishment of a citadel will require external technical advice and support. However, guidance on construction can be accessed from the sources listed at the annexes and is strongly recommended to be taken into account in the risk assessment.

建造避难所需要得到外部的技术指导和支持。但是，关于建造的指导意见可以从附件中所列的来源清单中获取，强烈建议在风险评估中考虑这方面。

As well as protection, a citadel must provide reliable means to communicate ashore and maintain some degree of situational awareness. The ability to deny control of propulsion to attackers is a further consideration.

除了保护，避难所还必须提供与岸上可靠的通信方式，并保持一定程度的态势感知能力。需进一步考虑的是拒绝袭击者控制推进系统的能力。

The SSP should define the conditions for use of the citadel and logistics necessary to survive e.g. food, water, medicines, first-aid kits. The use of the citadel must be drilled to ensure the Master is able to make the correct and timely decision on whether to retreat into it.

船舶保安计划应规定使用避难所的条件和生存所必需的后勤保障，例如食物、水、药品、急救箱。避难所的使用必须演练，以确保船长能够及时做出是否撤退的正确决定。

The whole concept of the citadel approach is lost if any of the crew are left outside before it is secured. Therefore, plans should include a method of ensuring that the entire crew have entered the citadel.

如果有任何船员被留在避难所的外面，避难所的完整意义就消失了。因此，计划应该包括确保全体船员都进入避难所的方法。

7.14 STS and other static operations

STS操作及其他动态操作

Attackers have boarded ships on STS operations via the fenders.

The use of a chain link fence, particularly if topped with razor wire, attached to the ships side rails and supplemented by stanchions in the vicinity of the fenders provides an effective deterrent to potential boarders. Care must be taken at the interface between the chain link fence and razor wire to ensure that the best possible protection is assured.

攻击者通过两船间防碰垫登上正在进行STS作业的船只。

使用防海盗铁丝网围栏, 特别是如果顶部设有带刀片铁丝网, 附着在船侧护栏和防碰垫支柱附近会对潜在的登轮人形成有效的威慑。铁丝网和铁丝网之间的接触面要小心处理, 以确保提供最好的保护。

The use of gratings, (particularly Glass Reinforced Plastic gratings for ease of fitting) may be secured in way of open Panama or roller fairleads which will further deter any potential boarding.

使用格栅（特别是玻璃增强塑料格栅，便于安装）封堵巴拿马开口或滚轮导缆孔的方式加以保护，进一步阻止任何潜在的登轮人。

An additional deterrent in the vicinity of the fenders, and ships fairleads could be the use of water spray.

使用高压水柱在防撞垫导缆孔附近形成额外的威慑力。

The hawse pipe should be properly secured to prevent unauthorized access. Use of the anchor wash may also provide a deterrent.

锚链孔应妥善封堵防止非法进入，使用锚链冲洗水也可防止非法闯入。

The main engines should be kept at immediate notice so the Master has the option of getting underway in the event of an incident.

主机应随时可用，以便船长在突发事件时可以选择继续开航。

Other considerations for the Master during STS or static operations:

船长在STS操作或静态操作期间需考虑的其他注意事项：

■ Is there sufficient crew to cover additional security whilst concurrently conducting cargo operations?

是否有足够的人员在执行货物作业的同时承担额外的保安任务？

■ Monitor emails during communications with shore side agents and agencies. Do not activate "reply to all", since emails may have around twenty (20) addressees. Do not let allow your intentions to be sent to unnecessary and unknown email addresses.

监控与岸上代理机构和代理的电子邮件交流。不要激活"回复所有人"，因为电子邮件可能有大约20个收件人。不要让你的意图被发送到不必要和未知的电子邮件地址。

7.15 Unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors

非武装私人海事安全承包商

The use of unarmed private maritime security contractors would be determined by the output of the risk assessment. Consideration should be given to the relevant laws of both flag States and any littoral States. The use of experienced and competent unarmed contractors can be a valuable protective measure, particularly where there may be the requirement to interface and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, naval forces and coast guards.

非武装私人海事安全承包商的使用将取决于风险评估的结果。应考虑船旗国和沿岸国的有关法律。使用有经验和有能力的非武装承包商可以提供有价值的保护措施，特别是在可能需要与当地执法机构、海军和海岸警卫队联系和协调的情况。

7.16 Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) and Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)

私人海上保安公司(PMSC)及私人合约武装保安人员(PCASP)

The use, of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on board ships would be determined by the out-put of the risk assessment and approval of respective flag State. This guidance does not constitute a recommendation or an endorsement of the general use of PCASP.

在船上是否使用合约的私人武装保安人员(PCASP)取决于风险评估和各自船旗国批准来决定。本指南不属于通常使用PCASP的建议或备忘的组成部分。

Any decision to engage the services of a PMSC & PCASP must be taken after a careful risk assessment of the intended voyage (see chapter 4) taking into account factors including route, type of cargo, speed, freeboard, and location of any static operations, levels of protection provided by littoral States and the current threat and risk environment. The employment of PCASP is only an additional layer of protection and is not an alternative to other mitigation measures.

任何雇佣私人海上保安公司（PMSC）& 私人武装合约保安人员（PCASP）的服务决定后，必须对预定航次(见第4章)考虑因素包括航线、货物类型、速度、干舷,和船位的任何静态操作,以及沿岸国家所能提供的保护水平、当前的威胁、环境风险等因素采取谨慎的风险评估。使用PCASP只是一种额外的保护措施，并不是其他缓解措施的替代办法。

The presence on board of PCASPs involves complex legal issues. It is important that permission is obtained from Flag State authorities before PCASP deployment on board. In addition, it is essential to ensure that PCASP are permitted by the governments of all States (littoral States) through whose waters the ship may pass, as the majority of littoral States do not allow PCASP to operate within their territorial waters. Owners must exercise due diligence to check the credentials and licences/permits of the PMSC and where appropriate the PCASPs, to ensure that they are operating legally and that the weapons are also licensed for their use. In addition to firearms, other equipment used by PMSC may be subject to arms control restrictions and also require licences for use by civilians. The owner is under a duty to perform due diligence on the PMSC as the owner will be liable for the PCASP on the ship. It is recommended that shipping companies employ PMSC that are accredited to the ISO 28007 standard (or any future standard that replaces it).

私人合约武装保安人员（PCASP）在船涉及复杂的法律问题。重要的是，在PCASP部署到船上之前，必须获得船旗国当局的许可。此外，由于大多数沿岸国不允许PCASP在其领海内作业，因此必须确保PCASP得到所有国家(沿岸国)政府的允许。船东必须进行尽职调查，以核实私营武装和安保服务公司(PMSC)的证件和许可证，以及在合适情况下检查私营军事和安保服务公司(pcasp)的许可证和许可证，以确保他们的操作合法，并确保武器也得到使用许可。除火器外，私营军事和安保服务公司使用的其他设备可能受到武器控制限制，并需要平民使用许可证。船东有责任对PMSC进行尽职调查，因为船东将对船舶上的PCASP负责。建议航运公司采用符合ISO 28007标准的PMSC(或任何替代标准的未来标准)

The PMSC must be engaged on a contract such as the BIMCO GUARDCON that does not prejudice the ship's insurance cover arrangements. The contract must be between the company and the PMSC even if the contract price is being paid for or contributed towards by a charterer or other party.

私人武装保安公司（PMSC）必须与BIMCO GUARDCON等不影响船舶保险安排的合同签订。合同必须是公司和PMSC之间签订，哪怕合同金额是由承租人或其他方支付或贡献的。

Companies should ensure that the PMSC has insurance policies that are current and compliant with the requirements of the contract.

公司应确保私人武装保安公司（PMSC）持有符合现行合同要求的保单。

There must be a clear understanding of the authority of the Master and the Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) under which the PCASP operate. RUF should provide for a graduated, reasonable, proportionate and demonstrably necessary escalation in the application of force in defence of personnel on the ship. The Master always remains the ultimate authority on a ship.

主管当局及船长必须清楚地了解私人合约武装保安人员（PCASP）运作所依据的使用武力（RUF）规则。船上武装护卫应根据明显逐步升级的保护需要，依照武器使用规则（RUF）逐步、合理、成比例的使用武器。船长永远是船上的最高领导者。

The individual PCASP must always act in accordance with the widely recognised principles of self and collective self-defence.

每个武装保安必须始终按照被广泛认可的个人保护和集体自卫原则行事。

PCASP procedures should be drilled with the crew to ensure their effectiveness during attack.

武装保安程序应和船员进行演练，确保在袭击期间行动更有效。

This guidance does not constitute a recommendation or an endorsement of the general use of PCASP. The use, or not, of PMSCs and deployment of PCASP on board ships is a decision taken by individual companies following a detailed risk analysis.

本指南并非推荐或认可船舶使用武装保安的组织部分，在船上使用或不使用私人海上保安公司（PMSCs）和部署私人武装护卫（PCASP）由每个公司经过详细的风险分析后作出决定。

If PCASP are deployed on board a ship, this should be included in all reports to designated VRA reporting centres and must be authorised by the flag State. Where risk analysis deems PCASP deployment necessary, it is recommended that companies use PMSC that are accredited to the ISO 28007 standard (or any future standard that replaces it).

如果武装保安（PCASP）部署在船上，该信息应该包括在所有提交给指定的VRA报告中心的报告中，并且必须得到船旗国的批准。如果风险分析认为PCASP部署是必要的，建议公司使用符合ISO 28007标准的私人武装护卫公司（PMSC）（或任何替代它的未来标准）。

If PCASP are to be used they should be as an additional layer of mitigation and protection, not as an alternative to other measures. The crew must not handle or use firearms.

如果雇用武装保安（PCASP），它们应该作为用来提供减轻和保护的附加保护措施，而不

是作为可替代的其他措施。船员不得携带或使用火器。

7.17 Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs)

船舶保安队

Armed Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) are sometimes deployed on-board ships. VPDs consist of armed State-appointed personnel. Their purpose is to deter attackers and, to defend the ship if necessary. The presence on board of VPDs involves complex legal issues and permissions may need to be obtained from the flag State and authorities in coastal and port States.

船上有时会雇佣武装保安部队（VPDs），VPDs由政府指定的武装人员组成。他们的目标是阻止袭击者，以及需要时保卫船舶。VPDs的存在涉及复杂的法律问题，可能需要从船旗国和沿海和港口国当局获得许可。

Section 8

Action on Attack and/ or Boarding

对攻击和/或登轮采取的行动

8.1 General 综述

There are a number of specific actions that may be taken if the crew suspects the ship is under an attack.

如果船员怀疑被袭击可采取一些具体行动响应。

A ship could quickly come under attack with little or no warning at any time. This reinforces the need for good lookout, both visual and radar. Attackers using weapons seldom open fire until they are very close to the ship e.g. two cables.

一艘船在任何时候都可能在几乎没有预警的情况下遭到快速攻击。这要求加强无论是视觉瞭望和雷达值守进行良好监控的必要性。攻击者很少使用武器开火，除非他们非常接近船舶，例如在两节锚链的距离内。

Using whatever time available, no matter how short, to activate any further additional protective measures and plans will make it clear to the attackers that they have been seen, and that the ship is prepared and, will resist attempts to board.

在尽可能短的时间内，启动/激活任何能提供进一步的额外保护措施和计划，使攻击者清楚地知道他们已经被发现，这艘船已做好准备，并将抵制其登船企图。

When a ship is at anchor it is unlikely that attackers can be detected and determined as threatening with sufficient warning to enable the ship to get underway and without exposing crew members on the upper deck (particularly the forecastle and bridge wings) to danger.

船舶抛锚时，船员不太可能及时发现攻击者并被确定为具有足够的威胁，并发出足够的警告。同时船舶无法避免使上层甲板上的船员（尤其是艏楼和驾驶台）暴露在危险之中而使船迅速起航。

8.2 Suspicious Approach

可疑目标接近

An approach by small craft may be a prelude to an attack. The Master should be ready to:

小艇接近可能是袭击的序幕。船长应准备：

- If underway, increase speed and manoeuvre away from the approaching small craft as much as possible to open the distance between the ship and the attackers. Thereafter, steer a straight course to maintain maximum speed. Consider evasive actions if the circumstances dictate and allow.

    如果在航行中，尽可能提高速度和机动航行，远离接近的小船，以拉开大船和袭击者

之间的距离。然后，保持最高速度直线航向。如果情况要求和允许，考虑规避行动。

- Minimise crew movement and confirm the ship's personnel are in a position of safety or warned to be ready to move.

  尽量减少船员移动，并确认船上人员处于安全位置或被提醒随时准备移动。

- Activate the ship security alert system (SSAS) which will alert the company and flag state. Put out a distress alert.

  启动船舶安全警报系统（SSAS），该系统将向公司和船旗国发出警报。发布遇险警报

- Activate the Emergency Communication Plan.

  启动应急联系计划

- Maintain contact with the relevant reporting centre preferably by telephone for as long as it is safe to do so. On receipt of information in relation to an attack, the reporting centre will inform the appropriate national maritime operations/law enforcement centre and in some cases military if in the area, and should ensure all other ships in the immediate vicinity are aware of the event.

  在安全的情况下，尽量与相关报告中心保持联系，最好是通过电话联系。在收到有关攻击的消息后，报告中心将通知有关的国家海事行动/执法中心，在某些情况下，通知在该地区的军事行动中心，并应确保附近的所有其他船只都知道这一事件。

- Place the ship's whistle on auto to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. Initiate the ship's pre-prepared emergency procedures such as activating water spray and other appropriate self-defence measures.

  将船舶的汽笛放在auto上，向任何潜在的攻击者表明本船知道了攻击并对其做出反应。启动预先准备好的应急程序，如启动喷水灭火装置和其他适当的自卫措施。

- Ensure that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is switched ON.

  确保AIS开启

- Confirm external doors and, where possible, internal public spaces and cabins, are fully secured.

  确认通往内部公共场所、房间的门全部处于锁闭状态。

8.3 When Under Attack

遭遇袭击时

When under attack, the following actions should be taken, as appropriate:

当遭遇攻击时，应酌情采取下述行动：

- Make a distress call on VHF and all available means.

  通过VHF和所有的可用方式对外发出求教信号

- Confirm the attack has been reported to the relevant reporting centre.

  确认袭击事件已报给相关的报告中心。

- Confirm the SSAS has been activated.

  确认SSAS已触发

- If underway, commence small alterations of course whilst increasing speed to deter the boarding craft from lying alongside the ship in preparation for boarding. These manoeuvres will create additional wash and make the operation of small craft difficult. To avoid a reduction in speed, large alterations of course are not recommended.

  如果在航行中，开始反复小幅改变航向，同时提高航速，以阻止小艇贴近大船旁边准备登船。这些操作将产生额外的波浪和使小艇操作更困难。当然，为了避免速度下降，不建议进行大角度改变航向。

- All crew, except those required on the bridge or in the engine room, move to the safe muster point or citadel. The crew should be given as much protection as possible should the attackers get close enough to use weapons.

  除了位于驾驶台和机舱操作船员外，所有船员都进入安全集合点安全舱室，当袭击者携带武器距离足够近时，船员应受到尽可能的保护。

8.4 Action if the ship is boarded

袭击者已登轮采取的行动

If the ship is boarded then the following actions should be taken:

如果袭击者已登轮，应采取如下行动

- Stop the engines and take all way off the ship if possible and navigationally safe to do so.

  停止主机运转，如果可能的话，采取各种方式切断设备及航行设备。

- All remaining crew members to proceed to the citadel or safe muster point. The whole concept of the citadel approach is compromised if any of the crew are left outside before it is secured.

  所有剩下的船员前往安全舱或安全集合点。如果在安全舱室完全锁闭前有任何船员被留在外面，整个安全舱的理念就会被连累。

- Ensure all crew are present in the citadel/safe muster point.

  确保所有船员在安全舱/安全集合点

- Establish communications with the company and any relevant military/law enforcement authority (see the annexes)

  与公司和相关军方/执法机构建立联系（见附录）

8.5 Action if attackers take control

如果袭击者控制船舶采取的行动

If attackers take control of the ship, violence or the threat of violence is often used to subdue the crew. The chance of injury or harm is reduced if the crew are compliant and cooperative and the following considered:

如果攻击者控制了船只，经常用暴力或暴力威胁被来制服船员。如果船员服从和合作，并考虑以下因素，就会减少受伤或受伤的机会：

- STOP ALL MOVEMENT WHEN THE ATTACKERS HAVE TAKEN CONTROL

AND TRY TO REMAIN CALM.

当攻击者控制船舶后应停止所有运动并保持冷静

■ Offer no resistance once the attackers reach the bridge and the crew have not moved to a citadel. The attackers will be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs or alcohol. When directed, all movement should be calm, slow, and very deliberate. Crew members should keep their hands visible at all times and comply fully. This will greatly reduce the risk of violence.

一旦攻击者已到达驾驶台，船员们还没有转移到安全舱室，不要去抵抗。袭击者可能会受到毒品或酒精的影响，非常兴奋，也会非常具有攻击性。当被指示时，所有的动作都应该是平静的，缓慢的，非常慎重的。船员应始终保持双手可见，并完全遵守。这将大大减少暴力的危险。

■ Leave any CCTV or audio recording devices running.
保持闭路电视（CCTV）或音频记录设备继续运转

■ Do not take photographs.
不要拍照

■ DO NOT attempt to confront the attackers.
不要试图和攻击者对峙

■ DO NOT make movements which could be interpreted as being aggressive.
不要做出让对方以为具有攻击性的运动

■ DO exactly what they ask and comply with their instruction.
做他们要求做的事，满足对方要求。

8.6 Kidnap 绑架

Kidnap can occur in any region where a threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Where a ship is hijacked, seafarers may be taken ashore to be held for ransom.

Each company should have a policy in place to cover the eventualities of kidnap and ransom.

在任何存在海盗威胁及武装抢劫的地方都发生过绑架。船舶被劫持后，海员有可能被带倒岸上并限制自由。每个公司都应制定一项政策来应对将来发生的绑架和赎金问题。

The following principles serve as guidelines to seafarers to survive a kidnapping.

下列原则作为船员在被绑架后的生存指南

DO NOT: 不要做

■ Be confrontational.
对抗

■ Offer resistance.
拒绝

■ Take photographs.
拍照

DO: 做

- Be positive.
  保持乐观

- Be patient.
  保持耐心

- Keep mentally active/occupied.
  保持积极/充实的心态

- Keep track of time.
  记住时间

- Reduce stress where possible by remaining physically active when possible.
  在可能的情况下，通过尽可能的保持体力活动来减轻压力

- Remain calm and retain dignity.
  保持冷静和尊严

8.7 In the event of military action

发生军事行动

In some areas military or law enforcement action may be provided to assist ships under attack in certain circumstances. On these occasions ship's crew should keep low to the deck and cover their head with both hands, with hands visible. On no account should personnel make movements which could be interpreted as being aggressive:
在某些区域，军队或执法行动可以在船只遭受某些攻击的情况下提供协助。在这种情况下，船员应保持尽量贴近甲板，并用双手遮住头部，双手可见。在任何情况下，船员都不应做出可能被理解为具有攻击性的动作

- Do not take photographs.
  不要拍照

- Be prepared to be challenged on your identity. Brief and prepare ship's personnel to expect this and to cooperate fully during any Naval/Military action onboard.
  任何海军/军事行动在船上时准备好接受对你的身份识别。船舶人员简要介绍和准备期待和军方充分合作

Section 9

Post incident reporting 事后报告

9.1 General 综述

Following any attack or suspicious activity, and after initial reporting of the incident, it is vital a detailed report of the incident is made. A copy of the report should be sent to the company, the flag State and other relevant organisations. It is important that any report contains descriptions and distinguishing features of any suspicious vessels that were observed (see the annexes and regional guidance for more detail). This will ensure full analysis and trends in activity of pirates and armed robbers are established and will enable assessment of pirate techniques or changes in tactics, in addition to ensuring appropriate warnings can be issued to other ships in the vicinity.

在发生任何攻击或可疑活动后，在对事件进行初始报告后，对事件进行详细报告至关重要。报告的副本应发送给公司、船旗国和其他相关组织。重要的是，任何报告都应包括所观察到的任何可疑船只的描述和特征（详见附件和区域指南）。这将确保建立对海盗和武装强盗活动的充分分析和趋势分析，并使评估海盗技术或战术变化成为可能。另外，确保能对附近其他船舶发出合适的警告。

The period following an attack will be confusing as Companies, Masters and crew recover from the ordeal. To give the investigating authorities the best chance of apprehending the perpetrators it is important that evidence is preserved in the correct manner and, Companies, Masters and crew should refer to IMO Guidelines on Preservation and Collection of Evidence, A28/Res.1091. By following some basic principles, the Master and crew can protect a crime scene until the nominated law enforcement agency arrives. When preserving and collecting evidence, the priority should be:

随着公司、船长和船员从痛苦中恢复过来，袭击发生后的这段时间将令人困惑。为了使调查当局有最好的机会逮捕肇事者，公司、船长和船员应参考海事组织关于保存和收集证据的准则A28/Res.1091规定，必须以正确的方式保存证据。通过遵循一些基本原则，船长和船员可以保护犯罪现场，直到指定的执法机构到来。在保存和收集证据时，应优先考虑：

- Preserve the crime scene and all possible evidence, if passage to a safe harbour is likely to take some time the Master should take initial statements from the crew (this and talking about the event may also help reduce the risk of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).

  保护犯罪现场和所有可能的证据，如果抵达安全港口还需要一段时间，船长应该听取船员的初步陈述（谈论这件事可能也有助于降低创伤后应激障碍的风险）。

- Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in doubt, do not touch and leave items in place.

  避免污染或干扰所有可能的证据-如果有疑问，不要触摸和保护现场。

- Do not clean up the area or throw anything away no matter how unimportant it may seem.

  不要清理这个区域或扔掉任何东西，不管它看起来多么不重要。

- Protect voyage data recorders for future evidence.

  保护VDR作为未来的证据

- Provide easy access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law enforcement authorities.

  为执法部门提供方便进入的犯罪现场和相关文件。

9.2 Investigation　调查

For law enforcement or naval/military forces to hold suspected pirates and armed robbers, following an incident, a witness statement from those affected is required. Seafarers are encouraged to provide witness statements to naval/military forces when requested to do so to enable suspected pirates to be held and handed over to prosecuting states. Without supporting evidence, including witness statements from those affected, suspected attackers are unlikely to be prosecuted.

执法人员或海军/军事部队在发生事件后扣留海盗和武装抢劫嫌疑犯时，必须提供受影响人员的证词。鼓励海员在被要求作证时向海军/军事部队提供证词，以便将海盗嫌疑犯拘留并移交给起诉国。如果没有证据，包括受影响的目击者的证词，嫌疑犯不太可能被起诉。

Law enforcement authorities will routinely request permission to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for on-going and future investigations and prosecutions following captivity. A thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential physical evidence, including electronic evidence, is not tainted or destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked. The company and crew are advised that the quality of the evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any investigation or prosecution that follows.

执法部门通常允许在船员被盘问完并收集证据后释放的请求，以便当时和后续调查和起诉及囚禁。彻底的调查对于确保潜在的物证，包括电子证据，不被污染或破坏或潜在的证人被忽视是至关重要的。建议公司和船员，验证提供的证据质量和船员出庭作证对随后的任何调查或起诉都有重大帮助。

Following any attack or approach the investigating authority will be determined by a number of external factors which may include:

在任何攻击或接触之后，调查机构将由若干外部因素决定，其中可能包括：

- Coastal State; 沿岸国
- Flag State; 船旗国
- Ownership; 船东
- Crew nationality.船员国籍所在国

Regardless of who is appointed the process is generally the same but will be dictated by local law enforcement practice. One overriding principle is that the seafarers should always be treated with respect and as survivors of a crime.

无论谁被任命，过程通常是相同的，但将由当地执法按惯例决定。一项最重要的原则是，应始终尊重海员，并将他们视为犯罪的幸存者。

Once appointed, the lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master and crew to understand the sequence and circumstances of the event. The process used is generally consistent and follows law enforcement practise.

首席执法机构一旦被任命将与船长和船员谈话，了解事件的顺序和情况。所使用的程序通常是一致的，并且遵循执法实践。

Law enforcement authorities may request permission to conduct post-release crew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity. A thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential physical evidence, including electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage, is not destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked.

执法当局可以请求允许被释放后的船员进行汇报，并为在被囚禁后的调查和起诉收集证据。彻底的调查对于确保潜在的物证（包括电子证据，如闭路电视录像）不被销毁或潜在的证人被忽视至关重要。

The quality of evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will significantly help any following investigation or prosecution.

提供的证据的质量和船员作证的可获取性将非常有助于随后的调查或起诉。

9.3 Reports 报告

It is important a detailed report of the event is provided to the relevant reporting authority. This will enhance knowledge of activity in the maritime domain and better tailor future warnings or advice the regional reporting centres issue to the maritime community.

重要的是要向有关报告当局提供有关事件的详细报告。这将提高对海上活动范围的认识，并更好地为各区域报告中心向航运界发出的警告或建议提供后续的参考

Companies and Masters may also be required to forward a copy of the completed report to their flag State, and are encouraged to do so.

公司和船长也可能被要求将完整的报告抄送给他们的船旗国，同时鼓励这样做。

9.4 Advice 建议

Interpol's Maritime Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. Interpol also has a Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) which supports any of the 192 member countries faced with a crisis situation or requiring urgent operational assistance. The CCC operates in all four of Interpol's official languages (English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is recommended that companies contact Interpol within 3 days of a hijacking of their ship.

国际刑警组织的海事工作组可以协助采取适当步骤，以保存留在犯罪现场的证据的完整性。国际刑警组织还有一个指挥和协调中心（CCC），为192个面临危机或需要紧急行动援助的成员国提供支持。CCC使用国际刑警组织所有四种官方语言（英语、法语、西班牙语

和阿拉伯语），一年365天，每天24小时工作。建议各公司在其船只被劫持后3天内联系国际刑警组织。

Interpol may also be consulted to discuss the recommended practices for the preservation of evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an investigation. Contact details are: email os-ccc@interpol.int; tel +33 472 44 7676.

还可以咨询国际刑警组织，讨论关于保存对进行调查的执法人员可能有用的证据的建议做法。

联系方式是：email： os-ccc@interpol.int;

　　　　　　　　Tel： +33 472 44 7676.

Section 10

Humanitarian considerations 人道主义考虑

Companies should ensure that seafarers are fully supported after an incident, even one in which an attack has been averted. Seafarers should always be treated with respect and as survivors of crime.

公司应确保在事故发生后，海员能得到充分的支持。即使是在避免了攻击的情况下，海员应始终受到尊重并被视为犯罪的幸存者（受害者）。

The number to call is +44 207 323 2737. Seafarers should ask for piracy support or for MPHRP by name. SeafarerHelp will contact MPHRP and someone from MPHRP will respond as soon as possible thereafter by calling back.

Further information can be found at http://seafarerswelfare.org/ piracy/mphrp

拨打+44 207 3232737致电防海盗支持或反海盗人道主义应急计划，他们会尽快回电。

List of Abbreviations缩写清单

AIS- Automatic Identification System
自动识别系统
BAM- Bab al-Mandeb
曼德海峡
CCTV-Closed Circuit Television
　闭路电视
CMF- Combined Military Forces
联合军事力量
CSO- Company Security Officer
公司保安员
EUNAVFOR- European Naval Forces Operation Atalanta
欧盟海军亚特兰大行动指挥部
GoG- Gulf of Guinea
几内亚湾
GoO- Gulf of Oman
阿曼湾
IFC-Information Fusion Centre Singapore
新加坡信息融合中心
IMB- International Maritime Bureau
国际海事局
IMB-PRC- International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre Kuala
Lumpur
国际海事局吉隆坡防海盗报告中心
IMO- International Maritime Organisation
国际海事组织
IRTA- Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
行业发布威胁公告
ISPS Code- International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
国际船舶和港口设施保安规则
JWC- Lloyd's Joint War Committee
劳氏社联合战争委员会
MARSEC Level- Maritime Security Level

海事保安等级

MDAT-GOG- Marine Domain Awareness for Trade- Gulf of Guinea
海洋领域的贸易意识-几内亚湾

MRCC- Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
海事安全合作中心

MSCHOA- Maritime Security Horn of Africa
非洲之角海事安全

NAVWARN- Navigation Warning
航行警告

PA System- Public Address System
公共广播系统

PCASP- Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
雇佣的私人武装保安人员

PMSC- Private Maritime Security Companies
私人海事保安公司

ReCAAP ISC- Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
亚洲打击海盗和武装抢劫船只区域合作协定

RUF- Rules for the Use of Force
使用武力规则

SEA- South East Asia 东南亚

SPMs- Ship Security Measures
船舶保安措施

SSAS- Ship Security Alert System
船舶保安报警系统

SSP- Ship Security Plan 船舶保安计划

STS/SBM- Ship to Ship Transfer /single Buoy Mooring
船对船过驳/单点系泊

UKMTO- United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations
英国海上贸易业务

VHF- Very High Frequency 高频电台

VPD- Vessel Protection Detachment
船舶保护分遣队

VRA- Western Indian Ocean 西印度

Appendix A

Other Maritime Security Threats

其他海上安全威胁

1. Introduction 介绍

This section deals with maritime security threats other than piracy and armed robbery, and, the fundamental requirements and recommendations to ensure that companies and ships can respond in a proportionate and dynamic way. Whilst this guidance has been developed for the specific purposes of mitigation against attack by pirates and armed robbers, experience has shown that some of the procedures and measures described can be applied to mitigate against other maritime security threats, depending on the threat profile.

本节讨论海盗和武装抢劫以外的海上安全威胁，基本要求和建议以确保公司和船舶能够采取合适的和随机应变的方式。虽然这一指导方针是为减轻海盗和武装抢劫而制定的，但经验表明，所述部分程序和措施可用于减轻其他海上安全威胁，具体取决于威胁情况。

The purpose of this section is to assist companies and Masters in identifying and preparing for maritime security threats other than piracy and armed robbery that may be encountered during a voyage. It also identifies the resources by which they can assess the risk to the ship and crew and identify measures to avoid and mitigate against the threat in the event that it materialises.

本章节的目的是协助公司和船长识别并提前准备在航行中可能遇到的海盗和武装抢劫以外的海上安全威胁。通过对船舶和船员的风险评估来识别资源和识别在确定威胁发生时避免和减轻威胁的措施。

2. Differences between Piracy and Armed Robbery and, non-Pirate Threats

海盗和武装抢劫以及非海盗威胁的区别

Other maritime security threats differ from piracy and armed robbery in a number of ways, and this affects the measures that can be taken to mitigate against them. In the case of pirates and armed robbers, the intent and methodologies of the attackers are well established across a number of geographical locations, as are the mitigation measures for deterrence and avoidance. By contrast, other threats are unpredictable, can emerge suddenly and may disappear just as quickly. The methodologies employed by the perpetrators behind these threats are also likely to vary significantly, and as such appropriate mitigation measures will vary depending on the nature of the threat.

其他海上安全威胁在许多方面不同于海盗和武装抢劫，这影响到可以采取用来减轻这些威胁的措施。在遭遇海盗和武装抢劫时，通过大量案例，在很多地点攻击者的意图和方

式（特点）已经被掌握，威慑和避免的减轻措施也已确定。相比之下，其他威胁是不可预测的，可能会突然出现，也可能很快消失。这些威胁背后的肇事者使用的方法也可能会有很大的不同，需要根据威胁的性质来决定。

4. Types of Maritime Security Threats other than Piracy and Armed Robbery

海盗和武装抢劫以外的海上安全威胁类型

The nature of a threat to the security of the ship will vary depending on circumstance, as described above, however, in broad terms, threats can be grouped according to the three definitions provided below. It should be noted that this list is not extensive and that other threats may emerge or be identified through risk assessment.

如上文所述，对船舶安全产生威胁的性质将因环境而异，但从广义上讲，威胁可以根据以下三种定义进行分类。应该指出的是，这一分类并非广泛适用，也可能出现其他威胁或通过风险评估加以确定的威胁。

3.1 Terrorism 恐怖份子

There is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism, however, in the context of maritime security it would generally mean attacking the ship, its crew or passengers in order to serve a political or ideological aim. Historically, there have been a number of terrorist incidents against shipping which have demonstrated the variety of methodologies at the disposal of terrorist organisations. By comparison with land-based incidents, shipping has a markedly low incidence of attack by terrorists, but the threat remains, and companies and ships' crews should remain vigilant and actively apply the provisions of the ISPS Code (see below). Relevant guidance may be issued by States, regional organisations and Industry bodies e.g. the Industry Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins.

就海上安全而言，对"恐怖主义"并没有统一的定义，然而，他们通常通过攻击船只、船员或乘客行动，来达到政治目的或意识形态的目的。从历史上看，曾发生过一些针对航运的恐怖主义事件，这些事件显示了恐怖主义组织所使用的各种方法。与岸上的事件相比，船舶受到恐怖分子袭击的发生率明显较低，但威胁依然存在，公司和船舶船员应保持警惕，并积极采取预防措施。

3.2 War and warlike activity

战争及类似战争行动

Areas of conflict , either international conflict or civil war, can present risks to ships and their crews. The extent of this risk will depend on the nature of the conflict and the modus operandi of the forces involved. Areas of enhanced risk to shipping due to perils insured under war risks are detailed in the Joint War Committee's Listed Areas and companies should refer to this as part of the risk assessment. Information is also likely to be provided by flag States under the requirements of the ISPS Code.

冲突地区，无论是国际冲突还是内战，都可能给船舶和船员带来风险。这种危险的范围/程度取决于冲突的性质和所涉武装力量的作案方式。联合战争委员会列出了因对航运造成风险增加的区域而投保战争险的详细清单，公司应将其作为风险评估的一部分。根据ISPS规则的要求，船旗国也应提供相关信息。

3.4 Cyber attacks

网络攻击

Ships are increasingly using systems that rely on digitisation, integration, and automation, which calls for cyber risk management on board. As technology continues to develop, information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) onboard ships are being networked together – and more frequently connected to the internet. This brings the greater risk of unauthorised access or malicious attacks to ships' systems and networks. Risks may also occur from personnel accessing systems on board, for example by introducing malware via removable media. The safety, environmental and commercial consequences of not being prepared for a cyber incident may be significant. The shipping industry Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships should be rigorously followed to ensure companies and ships are prepared for the risk of cyber attack.

船舶越来越多地使用并依赖数字化、集成和自动化的系统，这就要求船上进行网络风险管理。随着技术的不断发展，船上的信息技术（IT）和操作技术（OT）已被联网组合——而且越来越频繁地连接到互联网。这增加了未经授权访问或恶意攻击船舶系统和网络的风险。风险也可能产生在船上人员访问系统时，例如通过可移动媒体引入恶意软件。如没有为网络事件做好准备所可能带来重大的安全、环境和商业后果。应严格遵守航运业网络安全指南，确保公司和船舶针对网络袭击风险已准备好。

4. ISPS Code

国际船舶及港口设施保安规则

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and associated 2002 SOLAS Amendments were developed in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the perceived risks to ships and the danger of ships being used for terrorist purposes. The Code and amendments set out the statutory requirements for shipping companies, ships and their crews with respect to maritime security.

国际船舶和港口设施保安规则（ISPS Code）和相关的2002年SOLAS修正案是为应对2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击以及船舶被认为存在的风险和被用于恐怖主义目的的危险而制定。《规则》及《修正案》陈述针对船舶公司、船舶及船员在海事安全方面的法定规定。

The Regulations and Code enforce requirements on flag States, port States, shipping companies, ships and port facilities in order to ensure the security of the ship-port interface. Some flag Administrations may also designate security levels for specific sea areas. Under the Code all ships must have a flag-approved Ship Security Plan (SSP) which determines the measures to be applied at any one of three maritime security

(MARSEC) levels. The flag State will advise the ship of the MARSEC level during its passage and it is the ship's duty to comply by enacting the relevant measures as set out in their SSP. The process is overseen by the company and Ship Security Officers and the ship's Master.

该规范和法规是对船旗国、港口国、航运公司、船舶和港口设施的强制要求，以确保船-港界面的安全。一些船旗管理机构也可以指定特定海域的保安等级。根据规范要求，所有船舶都必须有一份由船旗国批准的船舶保安计划（SSP），该计划决定针对三种不同的海事保安等级（MARSEC）对应的应对措施。船旗国将在对应保安等级船舶过境期间向船舶提供咨询意见，船舶有责任按照《公约》的规定采取相关措施。这一过程由公司、船舶保安员和船长监督。

Full application of the provisions of the ISPS Code and, in particular, the thorough development and robust application of the SSP is fundamental to ensuring ship security. Whilst compliance with the Code is mandatory, there is nothing to prevent a company, CSO or Master enacting further measures beyond those determined by the MARSEC Level to ensure the safety and security of their ship, as set out below.

充分应用ISPS规则的规定，特别是周密的发展和坚定的应用船舶保安计划是确保船舶安全的基础。虽然遵守守则是强制性的，但没有什么可以阻止公司、安全员或船长制定超出海上保安等级所确定的进一步措施，以确保其船舶的安全。

5.Identifying and Preparing for Other Maritime Security Threats

识别和准备其他的海事安全威胁

The following sections explain the measures that should be applied by the company, CSO and Master to ensure that a ship is aware of and appropriately prepared for any threats that may be encountered during its voyage to the fullest extent possible. The processes which should be used correspond to those described in sections 3–9 of this guidance.

以下部分将解释公司、CSO和船长应采取的措施，以确保船舶在航行中尽可能充分地意识到并为可能遇到的任何威胁做好适当准备。应使用的流程与本指南第3-9章节中描述的程序相对应。

5.1 Threat and Risk Assessment

威胁和风险评估

The threat and risk assessments, as covered under section 4 of this guidance should identify and account for the risk to the ship from other maritime security threats. In determining this risk, the company, CSO and Master should follow the relevant guidance and latest updates from their flag States, insurance, national and regional authorities, military forces, and private security information providers.

本指南第4章节所述的威胁和风险评估应识别并说明其他海上安全威胁对船舶造成的风险。在确定这种风险时，公司、公司安全员和船长应遵循其船旗国、保险公司、国家和地方当局、军队和私人安全信息提供者的相关指导和最新更新的信息。

5.2 Company and Master's Planning

公司和船长的计划

It is important that as part of risk assessment and planning, the company, CSO, SSO and Master consider the threats that may be encountered during the voyage. This will provide a clear indication of mitigation measures to be applied.

作为风险评估和计划的一部分，公司、公司保安员、船舶安全员和船长考虑在航行中可能遇到的威胁非常重要。这提供须采取的缓解措施的清晰指示。

5.3 Ship Protection Measures

船舶保护措施

The threat assessment and company planning should indicate the likely presence of other maritime security threats during a voyage, and will determine the ship protection measures to be applied. It should be recognised that whilst some SPMs for piracy and armed robbery, such as increased watches and denial of access are likely to be useful in mitigating against some threat types, some measures are unlikely to be effective when the ship is faced with threats of a markedly different methodology or intent.

威胁评估和公司计划应指出航行中可能存在其他海上安全威胁，并将确定将采取的船舶保护措施。应该认识到，虽然有些针对海盗及武装抢劫的船舶保护措施，如增加瞭望人员和拒绝外人登轮可能有助于减轻对某些类型的威胁。当船面临威胁的方式或意图明显不同寻常时，一些措施不太可能有效。

5.4 Brief crew, check equipment and conduct drills

简要介绍，装备检查及实施演习

Crews should be briefed on the preparations and drills to be conducted to mitigate against identified threats other than piracy and armed robbery, prior to arrival in an area of risk.

在抵达危险区域前，应向船员简要介绍将进行的准备工作和演习，以减轻海盗和武装抢劫以外的已知威胁。

5.6 Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel

私人武装保安人员

It is important that companies, CSOs and masters are fully aware of caveats placed on the use of armed security teams under flag State licenses.

公司、公司安全员及船长应完全意识到武装保安队在船旗国许可下使用武器的注意事项。

5.7 Action when faced with an incident

面对事件时的行动

As described above, the actions to be taken when an incident is under way will be determined by the SSP.

如上所述，航行途中在遭遇事件中采取何种行动视船舶船舶保安计划而定。

5.8 Post Incident Reporting

事后报告

Any security incidents should be reported to the flag State and the relevant local authority. Where a VRA or other reporting area exists, then a report should also be provided to the relevant regional organisation as appropriate.

任何安全事件应向船旗国和有关地方当局报告。如果有自愿报告区（VRA）或其他需报告区域，则应酌情向有关地区组织提交报告。

Annex A

Western Indian Ocean Region

西印度洋区

1. General

This annex covers piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region i.e. types of attack and voluntary reporting processes. Admiralty Maritime Security chart Q6099 describes reporting and routing recommendations, and areas of heightened risk.

本附件包括西印度洋(WIO)地区的海盗和武装抢劫，即攻击类型和自愿报告程序。海军部海上安全图Q6099描述了报告和推荐航线，以及提升风险的区域。

The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the Bab al-Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary.

Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region.

该地区的地理位置多样，从巴布曼德海峡(BAM)和霍尔木兹海峡等狭窄的咽喉要道到索马里盆地广阔的海洋，范围很广。每个海域都有不同的挑战和威胁。袭击船只和船员的事件在整个地区均有发生。

Region-specific guidance for the WIO region is provided in BMP 5.

在BMP 5中提供了针对西印度洋区域WIO的特定指导。

Joint War Committee Listed Area

联合作战委员会列出的区域

The insurance community lists an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. The geographic limits of all JWC listed areas can be found on their website: www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.

保险界列出了该地区中的被认为风险较高的区域。；联合作战委员会（JWC）所列区域的地理界限可以在其网站上找到：www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.

Maritime Security Transit Corridor

海上安全过境走廊

The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on Admiralty Maritime Security chart Q6099.

海上安全过境走廊(MSTC)是一个军事走廊，海军部队集中部署和监视。海事安全走廊在

海军部海上保安海图Q6099有标识/解释。

It is recommended that vessels use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and surveillance.

建议船舶使用"海上安全走廊"，可得到武装部队的监视和保护。

2. Industry Releasable Threat Assessments and Bulletins.

行业发布威胁评估及公告

EUNAVFOR and CMF produce regular Industry Releasable Threat Assessments (IRTA) to inform risk management decision making for companies operating merchant ships transiting through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden (GoA), Gulf of Oman (GoO) and the Western Indian Ocean. The IRTAs are complimented by Industry Releasable Threat Bulletins (IRTB), also produced by EUNAVFOR and CMF, which cover specific events and reflect the dynamic nature of the operating environment. They are a vital resource to ensure the safety of ships in the region, and should be fully considered as part of the risk assessment

欧盟海军亚特兰大行动指挥部（EUNAVFOR）和联合军事力量（CMF）定期制作行业可发布威胁评估（IRTA）的信息，为那些运营通过红海、亚丁湾（GoA）、阿曼湾（GoO）和西印度洋的商船的公司提供风险管理决策。行业发布威胁公告（IRTB）对IRTAs进行了补充，该公告也由EUNAVFOR和CMF制作，涵盖了特定事件并反映了操作环境的动态特性。它们是确保该地区船舶安全的重要资源，应作为风险评估的一部分得到充分考虑

3. Registration and Reporting

注册和报告

UKMTO is the first point of contact for ships in the region. The day-to day interface between Masters and naval/military forces is provided by UKMTO, which tallks to merchant ships and liaises directly with MSCHOA and naval commanders at sea and ashore. Merhcant ships are strongly encouraged to regularly send reports to UKMTO.

英国海上贸易行动办公室（UKMTO）是该地区船舶的第一个联系点。船长和海军/军事部队之间的日常联系由UKMTO提供，它向商船倾斜，并直接与非洲之角海事安全中心（MSCHOA）和海上和岸上的海军指挥官联系。强烈鼓励商船定期向UKMTO发送报告。

MSCHOA is the planning and coordination centre for EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) MSCHOA encourages companies to register their ship's movements before entering the HRA and if participating in the group transit system via their website

MSCHOA是欧盟海军（EUNAVFOR）的规划和协调中心。如果公司船舶计划加入护航船队中MSCHOA鼓励在船舶进入高危区（HRA）前登陆下述网站注册船舶的动向www.mschoa.org.

The MSCHOA and UKMTO voluntary registration and reporting scheme in the WIO has proven extremely effective. It is important that reporting procedures are followed in order for military forces to monitor and give guidance at short notice on threats in the region. Ship reporting is the major indicator to MSCHOA on the level of implementation of protective measures.

Regional Contacts:

UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations)

Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org

Tel: +44 2392 222060

+971 50 552 3215

MSCHOA

Email: postmaster@mschoa.org

Tel: +44 (0)1923 958 545

+44 (0)1923 958 700

Fax: +44 (0)1923 958 520

Website: www.mschoa.org

USN Naval Control and Guidance to Shipping

Email: cusnc.ncags_bw@me.navy.mil

Tel: +973 3905 9583 (24hr duty phone)

Office: +973 1785 1023 (Office)

Other Useful Contacts

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)

Tel +60 3 2031 0014

Fax +60 3 2078 5769

E-mail piracy@icc-ccs.org

Web www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map

FURTHER INFORMATION 进一步信息

Further information and guidance can be obtained from the following organisations, websites or publications:

进一步信息及指南能够从下述组织、网站或出版物中获取

- IMO Maritime Safety Committee Circulars.

- Annual Summary of Admiralty Notices to Mariners.

- Admiralty List of Radio Signals (ALRS) volumes 1 and 6.

- The Mariner's Handbook, Chapter 13.

- Relevant Navigation Warnings and EGC SafetyNet broadcasts on Inmarsat C.

Annex B

Gulf of Guinea Region

几内亚湾区域

1. General

概述

This annex covers the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Region, types of attack and voluntary reporting processes. The area off the coasts of Cameroon, Benin Ghana,Nigeria and Togo, can be regarded as that in which mitigation measures against piracy and armed robbery should be applied. Attacks have occured from as far south as Angola and north as Sierra Leone.

本附件包括几内亚湾（GoG）区域、攻击类型和自愿报告程序。喀麦隆、贝宁、加纳、尼日利亚和多哥沿海地区可视为应采取打击海盗和武装抢劫的缓和措施的地区。袭击已发生在南至安哥拉，北至塞拉利昂区域。

Region-specific guidance for the GoG region is provided in Guidelines for Owners Operators and Masters for Protection against piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea Region.

为船东、经营人和船长专门制定针对几内亚湾地区防止海盗和武装抢劫的指南提供了具有地域特色的指南

Joint War Risk Listed Area

联合作战风险清单区域

Lloyds JWC has designated an area as being of perceived enhanced risk, and the JWC Listed areas should be consulted within a risk assessment to determine the appropriate self-protective measures that should be applied.

劳氏联合作战委员会（JWC）指定了一个认为是风险增强的区域，JWC所列出的区域应在风险评估中进行讨论，以确定应采取的适当的自我保护措施。

Registration and Reporting

登记和报告

The MDAT-GOG is the first point of contact for ships in the region offering a voluntary registration and reporting scheme. Merchant ships are strongly encouraged to register and report as highlighted in regional guidance and Chart Q6114 and French Navy Hydrographic Chart SHOM 8801CS.

航运界贸易意识（MDAT-GOG）是该地区为船舶提供自愿登记和报告计划的第一个联系点。强烈建议商船在区域指南中将注册和报告在该区域重点显著突出并关注海图Q6114和法

国海军航道图SHOM 8801CS中强调的内容。

MDAT-GoG

Tel: +33(0)2 98 22 88 88

E-Mail: watchkeepers@mdat-gog.org

Other Useful Contacts

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)

Tel: +60 3 2031 0014

Fax: +60 3 2078 5769

E-mail: piracy@icc-ccs.org

Web: www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map

Annex C

Asian Region 亚洲区

1. General 概述

Acts of piracy and armed robbery have occurred in the straits of Malacca and Singapore, the southern portion of the South China Sea, the Sulu-Celebes Seas and at certain ports and anchorages in Asia.

在马六甲海峡和新加坡、中国南海南部、苏禄−西里伯斯海和亚洲某些港口和锚地都发生了海盗和武装抢劫行为。

Region-specific guidance for the Asian region is provided in Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.

在亚洲地区反海盗和武装抢劫船只的区域指南中提供针对亚洲特定区域的指南。

Reporting 报告

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-to-goverment agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. Under the Agreement, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) was launched in Singapore in November 2006. It was formally recognized as an international organization in January 2007. To date, 20 States have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP.

《亚洲打击海盗武装抢劫船舶区域合作协定》（ReCAAP）是第一个促进和加强亚洲打击海盗武装抢劫合作的区域政府间协定。根据协议，ReCAAP信息共享中心（ReCAAP ISC）于2006年11月在新加坡成立。2007年1月正式被认定为国际组织。迄今为止，已有20个国家成为ReCAAP的缔约方。

Under the Agreement, Coastal States undertake the ownership to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, thus the reporting of incidents is based on this principle. The ReCAAP ISC strongly recommends the victim ship to report immediately the incident to the nearest Coastal State through its MRCC, in accordance with the IMO/MSC Circular 1334. The Coastal State is urged to undertake appropriate response. ReCAAP Focal Point of the Coastal State shares the verified information of incident through the Information Network System with the ReCAAP ISC and other Focal Points on a 24/7 basis. Based on the verified information, the ReCAAP ISC issues a warning and/or an alert, as appropriate.

根据该协定，沿海国承担打击海盗和武装抢劫船只的义务，因此报告事件是基于这一原则的。ReCAAP ISC强烈建议受害船只根据国际海事组织/MSC第1334号通告，立即通过其海事救援委员会向最近的沿海国报告事故。敦促沿海国作出适当反应。沿海国的ReCAAP联络点通过信息网络系统与ReCAAP ISC和其他联络点24/7共享已核实的事件信息。ReCAAP ISC会发出适当的警告和/或警报。

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is a multi-national maritime security information centre based in Singapore. It has international liaison officers from the of more than 10 countries working at the centre. The IFC aims to achieve early warning of maritime security threats through information-sharing cooperation with its partners to facilitate timely operational responses. Best Management Practice should be followed where practicable, taking into account inputs from the local maritime security agencies.

信息融合中心（IFC）是一个设在新加坡的多国海事安全信息中心。该中心有来自10多个国家的国际联络官员在该中心工作。国际信息融合中心的目标是通过与其合作伙伴的信息共享合作，实现海上安全威胁的早期预警，以促进及时的动态反应。在切实可行的情况下，应考虑到当地海事安全机构的投入，遵循最佳管理实践。

The Singapore IFC voluntary registration and reporting scheme is well established. This VRA is extremely large and should be considered in conjunction with the IFC listed 'areas of concern' and guidance provided when preparing a risk assessment. In the event of a suspicious approach or an actual attack, the Master should contact the nearest coastal State through its MRCC. Reporting requirements in Asia are complex and full details are contained in the Admiralty Charts Q6112 and Q6113.

新加坡信息融合中心自愿登记和报告制度已经建立。自愿报告区域（VRA）非常大，应与IFC列出的"关注范围"和编制风险评估时提供的指导意见一起考虑。如果有可疑的接近或实际的攻击，船长应该通过海事救援协调中心（MRCC）联系最近的沿海国家。在亚洲，报告的复杂要求和完整的细节包含在海军部海图Q6112和Q6113中。

REGIONAL CONTACTS

Information Fusion Centre (IFC)

Email: information_fusion_centre@defence.gov.sg

Tel: +65 6594 5728 or +65 9626 8965

Fax: +65 6594 5734

Website: www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

Email: info@recaap.org

Tel: +65 6376 3063

Fax: +65 6376 3066

Website: www.recaap.org

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)

Tel: +60 3 2031 0014

Fax: +60 3 2078 5769

E-mail: piracy@icc-ccs.org

Web: www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-mapp

Supporting Organisations

BIMCO是世界上最大的国际航运协会，在120多个国家拥有约2000个会员，占世界吨位的56%。我们的全球会员包括船东、经营人、经理、经纪人和代理人。作为一个非营利组织，BIMCO的使命是走在全球航运发展的前沿，提供专业知识和实用建议，以保障和增加会员企业的价值。

CDI 成立于 1994 年，是一家非盈利机构，以电子报告格式向其成员提供船舶和码头检查数据。CDI 的主要目标是不断提高化学品海运储运的安全性和质量性能；通过与工业和教育中心的合作，推动海洋运输和化学品储存行业最佳做法的发展；为化学品公司提供成本效益的风险评估系统，以协助其履行关注责任及分销管理规则。

 Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)

CLIA 是世界上最大的邮轮行业贸易协会，为全球邮轮界提供统一的声音和领导权威。CLIA 支持政策和实践，为每年超过 2500 万的邮轮乘客提供保安、安全、健康和可持续的邮轮环境，致力于提升邮轮旅游体验。该组织的使命是成为一个统一的全球组织，通过倡导、教育和促进邮轮社区的共同利益，帮助其成员取得成功。

 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)

ICS 是国际商船运营者贸易协会。ICS 代表国际行业的集体观点来自不同国家，部门和交易。ICS 成员由国家船东协会代表超过 80%的世界商船队。ICS 活动的一个主要焦点是国际海事组织（IMO），负责海上生命安全和海洋环境保护的联合国机构。ICS 广泛参与各个领域，包括影响商船贸易方面的任何技术领域、法律和经营方面事项。ICS 是独一无二的，因为它代表了所有全球不同的行业利益：散货船、油轮、集装箱和客轮营运人。www.ics-shipping.org

INTERCARGO

The International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners

1980 年于伦敦成立, 被授予 IMO 非政府组织协会地位, 自 1993 年, 是一个自愿的非盈利组织, 代表干货船船东的利益。INTERCARGO 提供论坛, 让优质的干散货船东、管理人员和运营者了解、讨论和分享有关关键主题和监管挑战的关注, 特别是在安全、环境和卓越运营方面。

INTERCARGO 推广最佳实践, 代表国际海事组织(IMO)、其他行业论坛以及更广泛的业务背景下的干散货航运利益。其战略基于自由和公平竞争的原则。

International Federation of Shipmasters' Associations

FSMA 成立于 1974 年, 由八个国家船长协会将世界上服务的船长联合成一个统一的专业协调机构。它是一个非营利性的非政治性组织, 专门致力于服务船长的利益。该联合会由来自 60 个国家的大约 1 万 1 千名船长通过其国家协会或作为个体成员。1975 年, IFSMA 被授予了作为国际海事组织的非政府组织协商咨询资格, 该联盟可以代表船长的意见, 保护船长的利益。

International Group of P&I Clubs

由 13 个主要销售保险的协会俱乐部"国际集团组成。它们为全球近 90%的远洋吨位提供责任保险(保护和赔偿)。俱乐部相互保险协会为其成员提供覆盖对第三方负债有关船舶的使用和操作, 包括生命损失, 石油污染和有害物质, 清除、碰撞和财产损失。俱乐部还为会员提供索赔处理、法律问题和损失预防等方面的服务。

International Marine Contractors Association

IMCA 代表了世界上绝大多数离岸海运承包商和相关供应链, 成员来自 60 多个国家。它出版了一份涉及广泛的技术指导文件, 其中包括关于货物操作良好做法、安全宣传材料、及时发布的注意事项和安全方面突发事件。其成员

受益于由四个主要部门组成的技术结构，包括海上潜水、航运、远程遥控系统和和近海测量。

这些都得到一个组织架构支持，其焦点是：健康、安全、保安和环境；能力和培训；起重索具；海洋政策及法规事务；还有合同和保险。该协会的全球覆盖范围分为五个地理区域：亚太、欧洲和非洲、中东和非洲印度，北美和南美。

InterManager

国际船舶管理协会是国际船舶管理行业协会。我们的成员是内部或第三方船舶经理，船员经理或相关组织和相关海事企业和组织。共同管理人员参与管理 5 000 多艘船只，并负责 25 万多名海员。

ICC International Maritime Bureau ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU

成立于 1992 年的国际海事局防海盗报告中心（IMB PRC）为航运业提供免费的 24 小时服务，报告发生在世界任何地方的任何海盗或武装抢劫事件。

国际海事局防海盗报告中心是一个独立的非政府机构，旨在提高人们对这些袭击风险地区的认识。作为世界各地向国际海事局防海盗报告中心报告事故的可信联络人，国际海事局防海盗报告中心将所有事故转告当地执法部门请求协助。信息也通过国际海事卫星组织安全网立即向所有船只广播，以提供和提高安全认识。www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre .

IPTA
International Parcel
Tankers Association **The International Parcel Tankers Association**

国际包裹运输协会，成立于 1987 年，代表专业化学品/包裹船队的利益，并已发展成为国际海事组织（IMO）分类化学品/包裹油轮船东的法定代表机构，成为监管机构和贸易组织联络船东的联络中心。IPTA 在 1997 年获得作为国际海事组织的非政府组织的咨询地位，并完全支持国际海事组织作为唯一引进和监督遵守国际海事立法的机构。www.ipta.org.uk

IMEC International Maritime Employers' Council Ltd

IMEC 是海运行业唯一致力于国际海上雇主关系的组织。在英国、菲律宾, 设有办事处，IMEC 拥有 235 多家船东和管理人，拥有约 8000 艘船舶，与 CBA 国际谈判论坛（IBF）。

IMEC 还积极参与海事培训。IMEC 的增强学员计划在菲律宾目前已经完成超过 700 名年轻人的培训。

 The International Seafarers Welfare and Assistance Network

国际海运福利及援助网络是一个在 UK 注册的国际非政府组织，致力于提高全球范围内的海员福利。成员包括船东、工会、福利机构。我们与包括 P&I、船公司、港口及政府等实体一起工作。我们关注全球 150 万海员的福利。

我们资助因海盗影响的海员及他们的家庭, 提供 24 小时多种语言求助热线，无论在世界的什么地方，船员均可免费拨打。www.seafarerswelfare.org

 International Transport Workers' Federation

国际运输工人联合会是一个国际（ITF），是国际运输工人工会联合会。任何在运输业有成员的独立工会都有资格成为 ITF 的会员。自 1896 年以来，ITF 一直在协助海员，而今天，ITF 代表了全世界海员的利益，其中逾 88 万名海员是 ITF 附属工会的成员。ITF 正在努力改善所有国籍的海员的条件，并确保对航运业进行充分的监管, 以保护工人的利益和权利。ITF 帮助船员，不管他们是什么国籍。

Intertanko 指国际独立油轮船东协会，是一个行业会议、政策讨论和最佳实践的论坛。自 1970 年以来，INTERTANKO 一直是独立油轮船东发出的声音，确保保证全球的液体能源运输安全、可靠和具有竞争力。

Joint War and Hull Committees

联合船体和联合战争委员会由劳氏船级社和 IUA 公司市场的保险业者代表组成，他们代表了在伦敦市场从事海上船体和战争保险业务人的利益。

这两类承销商都受到海盗问题的影响，并支持通过船东的使用 BMP 来减轻它们面临的风险。船东和租船人的行为将为保险人处理风险和承保范围提供依据。

The Oil Companies International Marine Forum

OCIMF 是对原油、石油产品、石化产品和天然气的装运和终端有兴趣的各石油公司自愿成立的协会（"会员"）。OCIMF 的使命是成为油船、码头和海上支援船安全及环保作业方面的最高权威，促进设计和作业标准的持续改进 www.ocimf.org

The Society of Independent Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd

SIGTTO 独立气体油轮和码头运营商协会有限公司，该协会是一个国际性组织，旨在行业成员之间技术信息和经验交流，以提高油轮和码头的安全性和操作可靠性。

为此目的，协会出版研究报告，并出版信息论文和参考著作，以供行业会员参考。它与其他行业机构、政府和政府间机构（包括国际海事组织）保持工作关系，以更好地促进天然气运输和储存计划的安全和完整。

The World Shipping Council (WSC)

是代表国际班轮航运业的行业协会。WSC 的成员公司经营集装箱船、滚装／滚装船和汽车运输船，它们占全球班轮能力的 90%左右。这些服务总共运输了全球海运贸易价值的 60%，或每年超过 4 万亿美元的货物。WSC 的目标是为班轮航运业提供一个协调的声音，在其与政策制定者和其他行业团体的合作中，为世界上的一些国家制定可行的解决方案。

支撑最佳实践（BMP）的海军军事力量/执法组织

 Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

海上联合部队（CMF），是由全球 32 个国家自愿组成的持久的海事合作伙伴关系的组织，为了共同的目标进行海上安全行动(MSO) 合作，以提供安全和稳定的海上环境。CMF 操作三个联合任务部队(CTF)，横跨美国红海, 亚丁湾, 索马里盆地, 阿拉伯海北部, 海湾阿曼, 印度洋和阿拉伯海湾。联合任务部队 150 (CTF150) 负责海上安全和反恐, CTF151 负责威慑、干扰和打击海盗, CTF152 重点负责阿拉伯海的海上安全和反恐。

访问 www.combinedmaritimeforces.com

or e-mail us at cmf_info@me.navy.mil

 EUNAVFOR (The European Naval Force) 欧盟海军

海盗和其他海上安全问题继续对航行于红海南部、非洲之角及西印度洋的海员构成威胁。欧盟 NAVFOR 的任务是(1)保护世界粮食计划署和其他易受攻击的船舶，和；（2)制止、防止并压制海上海盗和武装抢劫行为。这需要(3)加强合作与协调，维护越来越大范围的海上航行自由，构建广泛的海上安全架构。欧盟 NAVFOR 还负责（4）监监控马里海域的渔船活动。因此，作为行动的催化剂，欧盟 NAVFOR 继续推动区域海上安全问题的解决，从而为欧盟在这一具有战略重要性的地区开展更广泛的安全、能力建设和能力建设工作做出贡献。http://eunavfor.eu/

 Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

非洲之角海上安全中心（MSCHOA）是欧盟海军（NAVFOR）的一个重要组成部分，由欧盟 NAVFOR 的军事和文职人员组成，在操作总部内办公。MSCHOA 为亚丁湾、索马里盆地和非洲之角附近的海员提供服务。这是一种对联合国安

理会第 1816 号决议和随后的审议的支持协调，该中心致力于根据该地区商船遭受攻击的风险，维护合法的航行自由。欧盟海军和联合作战部队致力于确保海员有最最新的定期威胁评估和事件特定公报，由该安全中心发布/出版。通过与航运公司、船长和其他利益相关方的密切对话，MSCHOA 总结了这些水域中易受攻击的目标情况及其途径。同时，MSCHOA 可以充当信息共享中心，为海上交通提供支持和保护。显然有必要保护船只及其船员免受非法和危险的攻击，以保护一个全球关键的贸易航线。www. mschoa.org

UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)英国海上贸易业务

UKMTO 能力主要作为商船和联络的军事力量在该地区的接触点。UKMTO 也管理船舶根据海上安全图 Q6099 执行志愿自愿报告的计划，商船可以定期发送报告，提供其在下一个停靠港的位置/速度和预计到达时间。

随后，影响商业交通的相关信息可以直接传递到海上的船舶上，并对相应地资产进行响应，从而提高对事件的集体响应能力。有关 UKMTO 的更多信息，请联系：

Emergency Telephone Numbers:

+44 (0)2392 222060 or +971 5055 23215

Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org

Web: www.ukmto.org